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MERGER CONTROL IN THE UNITED




Traditionally, antitrust lawyers counseling American firms
doing business abroad routinely advised clients that so long as
their conduct satisfied domestic antitrust standards, they need
have little concern with the antitrust laws of foreign nations. A
new day has dawned, however, particularly with respect to the
Treaty of Rome.' By the late 1970s, it had become obvious that
the competition policy standards promulgated by the European
Community (EC) were in some respects more restrictive than our
own. This was particularly true with respect to distribution
restraints2 and conduct, which might be characterized, in the
language of Article 86, as an "abuse of a dominant position."3
Although aware of the heightened standards that the EC was
applying in antitrust cases, many in the American business
community reacted with outrage when the European
* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This
article is an expanded and updated version of the Third Annual Bernstein Lecture
given at St. John's University School of Law in 1998. The lecture series is named for
Lew Bernstein, with whom I served in the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice from 1972 through 1976.
1 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
2 See 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 403-07 (2d ed. Supp. 1994)
(providing a general discussion of the differences between the treatment of
distribution restraints under the U.S. and EC competition policy regimes).
3 EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 86; see also Thomas E. Kauper, Whither Article
86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Refusals to Deal, 1989 FORDHAM CORP.
LAW INST. 651 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990) (discussing the differences between
American law and the rules of the European Commission with respect to single-firm
dominance).
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Commission ("Commission) 4  announced its intention to
challenge the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger. After all, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had indicated that it would not
challenge the merger.5 Even though U.S. enforcement agencies
have regularly asserted authority over mergers of foreign firms, 6
the Commission was criticized for interfering with the Boeing
acquisition. Some members of the American legal and business
communities argued that the merger was outside the jurisdiction
of the EC, and that by exercising jurisdiction, the EC was
discriminating against American firms in an attempt to protect
Airbus, a European consortium. 7 This reaction, however, failed
to consider that the EC had acted similarly in other cases not
involving American firms. The Commission's decision to
challenge the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, rather than
signaling some type of discriminatory intent, may more
accurately be viewed as continuing a tightening of what was
once a lax policy toward antitrust enforcement, particularly with
respect to mergers.
Historically, the European Commission has been seen as
relatively lenient with respect to mergers, tolerating acquisitions
that would be unlawful in the United States or elsewhere.
German officials and scholars have criticized the Commission on
this score.8 Some member states, however, feel the Commission
4 The European Commission is the EC agency charged with enforcing antitrust
regulations.
5 See Boeing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 24,295 (FTC July 1, 1997).
6 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMON, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.14, at 19-20 (1995) (setting forth
Illustrative Example H, indicating that U.S. enforcement agencies can establish
jurisdiction over the merger of foreign firms). The Department of Justice and the
FTC have indicated that they "would apply the same principles regarding their
foreign commerce jurisdiction to Clayton Section 7 cases as they would apply in
Sherman Act cases." Id.
7 See, e.g., Harry First, The Intersection of Trade and Antitrust Remedies, Fall
1997, ANTITRUST 16, 18-19 (quoting remarks of President Clinton criticizing the
Commission's handling of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger); Interview with
Thomas L. Boeder and Benjamin S. Sharp, Attorneys for Boeing, Fall 1997,
ANTITRUST 5, 6 ("The Europeans in this particular case were worried about [the]
merger because it would have an incremental benefit to the merged party and have
an incremental detriment to the European competitor."); Michael L. Weiner,
Conflict and Cooperation: Meeting the Challenge of Increasing Globalization, Fall
1997, ANTITRUST 4, 4 ("Boeing accused the European Commission... of acting to
support Airbus, regardless of the merits of the transaction.").
8 See, e.g., Rainer Bechtold, Antitrust Law in the European Community, 1992
FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 343, 353 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993) (indicating that
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has been too severe. This conflict is evidenced by the French
challenge to the Commission decision, which was supported by
the German government, in the Kali + Salz case.9 Others have
suggested that while the Commission has tolerated or is
prepared to tolerate mergers that might be treated as unlawful,
under American standards, the Commission may be acting more
reasonably in some cases than the United States would.10
Common to all these criticisms is an assertion that in some
material ways American and EC laws differ with respect to
mergers. This article, however, will demonstrate that the
similarities far outweigh the differences, and that even the
differences will diminish over time as enforcement officials in
both the United States and the EC adapt to the needs of firms to
be competitive on a global scale.
The idea to perform a comparative study between U.S. and
EC merger control policy began not with Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas but with my re-reading of an article published in 1992
by Robert Pitofsky, now Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission." In this article, Pitofsky suggested changes in the
enforcement of section seven of the Clayton Act that, in his view,
would enhance the competitiveness of American firms in the
global economy.12 In contrast to the enforcement measures that
prevailed during the 1980s, Pitofsky urged "tighter enforcement
across the board" with respect to horizontal and vertical mergers
German merger controls were generally perceived as both more rigid and severe
than those adopted at the outset by the European Commission, leading to the
conclusion that there was likely to be conflict between the two systems). Early on in
the history of the Merger Regulation, German officials were fearful that the
Commission would not adopt a collective dominance approach. This fact was noted
and relied upon by the European Court of Justice in the Kali + Salz decision. See
infra note 9.
9 See Joined Cases C 68/94 & C 30/95, France v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. I-
1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829 (1998) [hereinafter Kali + Salz]. In Kali + Salz, the
Court of Justice of the European Communities heard an appeal of the European
Commission's decision in Commission Decision 94/449, 1994 O.J. (L 186) 38 (Case
No. IV/M.308 Kali + Salz/MdKITreuhand) [hereinafter Kali + Salz Commission
Decision].
10 See generally Dennis W. Carlton & William D. Bishop, Merger Policy and
Market Definition Under the EC Merger Regulation, 1993 FoRDHAM CORP. LAW
INST. 409 (Barry Hawk ed., 1994) (noting ways in which the European approach
was more lenient than others and suggesting that a more lenient approach could be
justified given the nature of European markets).
11 See Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement
in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195 (1992).
12 See id. at 198.
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and "focused enforcement against some few conglomerate
mergers," on the premise that stricter enforcement would
enhance the competitiveness of American firms. 13 Specifically,
Pitofsky stated that "[t]he best way to foster the ability of
American firms to compete effectively in global markets is to
ensure that the markets in which they compete at home are
highly competitive."14 As part of this approach, he urged that
stricter enforcement should be accompanied by a greater
recognition of efficiencies as a defense, 15 a liberalized failing
company and failing division defense, 16 an exception for certain
"distressed industries,"17 and a narrow defense for mergers that
facilitate research and development.' 8
Chairman Pitofsky was not proposing a merger policy that
was any less severe than that of the European Commission. He
was proposing a trade-off, a tightening of the standards for
measuring anti-competitive effects, but only where the defenses
he proposed were recognized. As to the efficiencies defense, he
proposed emulating, not departing from, the standards of the
EC. 19  Nevertheless, two phenomena have occurred since
Chairman Pitofsky made these proposals: (1) such a defense is
now being recognized in the United States, and (2) whatever the
promise may have been in 1992, there is little to suggest that in
fact the EC has been giving significant weight to efficiency
claims. This may indeed be a significant difference in the two
regimes, but it cuts in the opposite direction from that which
Pitofsky described in 1992.
Much can and has been said about Pitofsky's proposal, as
well as similar proposals, not all of which will be addressed here.
The most striking aspect of Pitofsky's proposal is the conjunction
of two propositions. First, the allowance of certain mergers




16 See id. at 199.
17 Id. A distressed industry is one "in which most or all firms have low profits
and chronic underutilization of capacity." Id.
18 See id.
19 See id. 206-27 (discussing the efficiencies defense). Pitofsky proposed that
the U.S. adopt an efficiencies defense after noting that the major trading partners of
the U.S., including the EC, already recognize such a defense. See id. at 213-15.
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difference in the ability of firms to compete internationally. 20
Second, the resistance to an efficiencies defense is "out of step"
with the merger rules in other countries, where efficiencies are
commonly recognized. 21 The same point is made as to failing
firms and distressed industries, but with less emphasis. 22 The
implication is that firms subject only to American antitrust
standards are competitively handicapped, at least in part
because foreign firms are allowed to merge in circumstances
presenting efficiency justifications when American firms are not.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this amounts to an assertion
that American competition policy is anti-competitive, to some
degree.
This is not a new proposition. From the very beginning, the
key lament of those in the so-called "Chicago school" was that
antitrust policy of an earlier day was anti-competitive precisely
because it failed to focus on issues of efficiency.2 While the
argument did not focus on global competitiveness, being
presented at a time when, for a variety of reasons, little
attention was being paid to such matters, the argument was to a
significant degree the same. Even so, however, proponents of the
Chicago approach did not urge, and some opposed, recognition of
a specific efficiencies defense in merger cases.24
I. BACKGROUND FOR ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
Mergers in the United States, or those which significantly
impact American markets, are governed by section seven of the
20 See id. at 205-06.
21 See id. at 213-15. Pitofsky argued that "[uin resisting incorporation of an
efficiencies defense into merger enforcement, the United States is remarkably out of
step with the law of other industrialized countries." Id. at 213.
22 See id. at 232-33 ("At most, there is a generalized sense in reviewing foreign
statutes and cases that many countries are more willing to take distressed industry
considerations into account by allowing specialization arrangements, block
exemptions, cartels, and occasionally, mergers.").
23 See id. at 210-11.
24 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 123-29 (1978) (detailing arguments against recognition of an efficiencies
defense); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMAIC PERSPECTIVE 112-13
(1976) (same). The classic statement of the contrary position is Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also 4A PHILLIP AREEDA ET. AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1040 (1980)
(providing a complete discussion of the efficiencies defense in merger cases).
2000] 309
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Clayton Act.25 Like all U.S. antitrust laws, section seven's
substantive standards are put in the most general terms.
Simply put, the statute reaches acquisitions whose effect "may
be substantially to lessen competition."26 Putting flesh on this
skeleton was left to the federal courts. Cases brought in the
1960s and early 1970s were invariably brought after the
consummation of the acquisition.27  Thus, if a violation was
found, the acquisition had to be undone.28 Divestiture, with all
of its inadequacies, was the remedy of the day.29
All that changed with the enactment of the advance
notification requirements as part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.30 Covered acquisitions
could not be consummated until notice, a somewhat euphemistic
term for the elaborate information submissions now required,
was given to the agencies.31 The agencies were given the
opportunity to investigate and obtain much of the information
necessary to evaluate the merger's effects before
consummation.32 The remedy of choice was no longer post-
consummation divestiture, but preliminary injunction. Hart-
Scott-Rodino wrought changes in the dynamics of merger
analysis and litigation which have gone far beyond what even
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
26 Id.
27 See S. REP. No. 94-803, at 61-62 (1976).
28 See id.; H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976).
29 The enactment of the pre-merger notification procedure in 1976 was driven
in part by the desire to avoid the difficulties inherent in the divestiture remedy.
Divestiture is the most commonly sought remedy in merger cases because of the
inability of the enforcement agencies to carry out a full investigation prior to
consummation of the transaction. See S. REP. No. 94-803, at 61-65; H.R. REP. No.
94-1373, at 8; The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Hearings on S. 1284 Before
the Subcommission on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 90, 96 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Thomas E.
Kauper); see generally Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?,
12 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969) (discussing the difficulties with the divestiture remedy).
Ironically, most merger cases are now resolved by consent decrees and most of these
decrees require some form of divestiture. See Mary Lou Steptoe & David Balto,
Finding the Right Prescription: The FTC's Use of Innovative Merger Remedies, Fall
1995, ANTITRUST 16, 16 (recognizing an increase in the number of consent decrees
and noting that divestiture is "the most common remedy" under these agreements).
30 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). The pre-merger notification
provisions are contained in section 7A of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1994).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1).
32 See id. §18a(e).
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those of us involved in its enactment could have contemplated in
our wildest dreams. 33 It is sufficient here simply to note that the
Act brought investigation of virtually all significant mergers and
put new teeth in government enforcement programs.
The European Commission struggled with merger control
almost from the time the Treaty of Rome came into effect. While
the Commission proceeded against and investigated mergers
under the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in Article
86,34 merger control was largely in the hands of member states
until the Merger Regulation came into effect in 1990. With the
striking exception of Germany, authorities in the member states
had neither the legal control machinery nor the inclination to
intervene in major acquisitions. Reaching consensus on the
Merger Regulation was difficult, spanning nearly twenty years of
discussion. There was little agreement as to when, if ever,
mergers presented a competition problem. Nor was there a
strong desire to surrender control over mergers that impacted
inter-member trade to the exclusive jurisdiction of the European
Commission, as was being proposed.
The Commission did not become a major factor in merger
control until the EC Merger Regulation came into effect ten
years ago.3 5  The Merger Regulation begins with the
establishment of turnover thresholds.3 6 Mergers that fall below
these turnover levels, which were lowered in 1998, are not
covered by the Merger Regulation and are left to the control of
member states.37 Above the set thresholds, jurisdiction is vested
33 See William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 825 (1997) (indicating
that "[alt the time of its enactment it was described as one of the most far-reaching
changes in antitrust enforcement since the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914"); Joe
Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on
Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to
Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 865 (1997) (discussing the "dramatic
impact" of the legislation).
34 See HAWK, supra note 2, at 954-63 (discussing the use of Article 86 and its
limitations in merger cases).
35 See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentration Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14, as amended by Council
Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180) [hereinafter EC Merger Regulation].
36 See id. art. 1, 2, at 16.
37 See id. Thresholds are set in terms of the world-wide and community-wide
turnover of the parties to the merger. See id. Threshold levels were substantially
lowered by the 1997 amendment, which took effect in 1998. See Council Regulation
1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180).
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exclusively in the Commission, and member states may act only
if the Commission, under the terms of Article Nine, refers the
matter back to them.38 Thus, the Commission's reach is confined
to mergers involving large firms, a distinct difference from the
authority of the U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC.
Therefore, not only is the EC's merger control relatively new, but
the Commission, each year, examines a far smaller number of
mergers than its American counterparts. 9 There is, to date, a
relatively small amount of raw material from which to divine the
Commission's approach to mergers.
Like Hart-Scott-Rodino, albeit with different time periods,
the Commission's Merger Regulation established a system of
advance notification and suspension of the merger during the
ensuing investigation.40 As in the United States, the purpose is
to review mergers before their consummation with an eye toward
preventing those likely to be anti-competitive.
In both procedural and institutional terms, U.S. and EC
merger controls are strikingly similar. First, both require
advance notification and a mandatory period for investigation
prior to consummation. Secondly, both focus on prohibition
rather than subsequent divestiture as the primary relief.41
Thirdly, mergers must be judged in terms of future probabilities
rather than actual effects. This puts heavy emphasis on
38 See EC Merger Regulation art. 9, %% 1-10, supra note 35, at 20.
39 In the first few years after the effective date of the merger regulation, the
Commission dealt with about fifty notified mergers a year; a number that increased
in 1998, the year thresholds were lowered to about 200 mergers. See Alexander
Schaub, EC Competition System: Proposals for Reform, 1999 FORDHAM CORP. LAW
INST. 129, 137 (Barry Hawk ed. 1999).
40 See EC Merger Regulation art. 4, 1, supra note 35, at 17 (requiring notice
to the Commission within 1 week of the "conclusion of the agreement [to merge], or
the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest"); art.
7, 1, at 19 (suspending mergers prior to notification and for an additional three
weeks after notification); art. 10, % 1, at 20-21 (establishing time limits for
investigatory period).
41 Under both regimes, however, divestiture is a common element in resolving
cases by consent. In the United States, consent decrees entered into to avoid
litigation commonly include some divestiture. In Europe, it is relatively common to
offer various undertakings modifying the original proposed transaction to avoid a
finding that the merger is incompatible with the common market. These
undertakings or commitments commonly include some degree of divestiture. See
Gtz Drauz, Remedies Under the Merger Regulation, 1996 FORDHAM CORP. LAW
INST. 219, 223-25 (Barry Hawk ed., 1997); Martin Heidenhain, Commitments in EC




approaches that are predictable and have both a sufficient
degree of clarity and transparency to enable those who counsel
in such matters to do so with at least a modicum of confidence.
In the United States, these predictive rules begin, and in some
cases may end, with an examination of market shares and
concentration data. Very low combined market shares may
indicate, without further examination, that a merger poses no
competitive threat.4 2  Very high market shares and
concentration alone may lead to a challenge or at least to a
presumption of illegality.4 3 Other factors such as buyer size and
product homogeneity may be critical in cases in the middle.
Specific defenses such as efficiency may be available. Whatever
may be said about the substance of American law, the courts and
enforcement agencies have attempted to establish a set of
"rules," or, more accurately, a method of analysis which is
relatively clear. To a degree, we have been prepared to sacrifice
correctness, albeit to as little an extent as possible, for
predictability under a statute which provides virtually no
guidance at all.
The approach in the EC is in many ways similar. The
Commission is also confronted with the need to provide rules
that flesh out its Merger Regulation in an understandable way.
Like the Clayton Act, the Merger Regulation itself is too general
to be of assistance to those counseling on merger matters. 4 In
42 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.51(a) (1992), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) % 13,104
[hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINEs] (stating that mergers below a post-merger
concentration level of 1000 on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of market
concentration "are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily
require no further analysis").
43 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)
(holding that a merger should be presumed to be unlawful when the combined firms
held an undue market share and when merger would result in a significant increase
in concentration). The 1992 guidelines provide that when the post-merger HHI is
over 1800 and the increase in concentration brought about by the merger is over 100
points, the merger is presumed "to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise." 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.51(c).
4 Under Article 2(3) of the EC Merger Regulation, "[a] concentration which
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be declared incompatible with the common market." EC Merger Regulation
art. 2, % 3, supra note 35, at 17. Under Article 2(1), the Commission in making its
appraisal is to consider, among other things, market structure, actual or potential
competition, the economic and financial power of the parties, barriers to entry,
supply and demand trends, the interests of consumers, and "the development of
20001
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the ten years since the effective date of the Merger Regulation,
the Commission has sought to develop a clearer, standard
method of analysis. As in the United States, it begins with
market share and concentration data.45 Beyond that, however,
its approach to date has been somewhat less precise. Indeed,
there is a feeling in Europe that precision may not have the
value accorded to it in the United States. Commission decisions
may appear to be more ad hoc, while in fact outcomes may be the
same.
Critical to predictability is transparency. Rules are of little
consequence unless they are known. In the United States, we
tend to believe that transparency is provided by court decisions.
This is in one sense true. The ultimate responsibility for
antitrust policy in the United States rests with federal courts
whose decisions are publicly reported, widely known, and
analyzed. But in the real world of merger enforcement, court
decisions simply set outer boundaries. In the vast majority of
cases, decisions of the enforcement agencies are outcome
determinative. Once the agencies decide not to challenge, the
merger can proceed.46 The reverse is also true. If the agencies
believe a merger is anti-competitive and threaten legal action to
block it, with few exceptions, the parties either negotiate a
consent decree "fixing" the competitive problem, often
reintroducing the once discredited divestiture remedy into the
equation,47 or they abandon the transaction. Firms whose
mergers are challenged do have one important intermediate step
available, namely, to force the agency to go to court to obtain a
preliminary injunction. Only at that point, if the agency wins,
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and
does not form an obstacle to competition." Id. art. 2, 1, at 16.
45 Any reader of EC merger decisions will be struck by the application of an
almost automatic format, which begins with market definition and calculation of
market shares. The Preamble to the EC Merger Regulation provides that when
combined market shares are below 25%, the merger is presumed to be compatible
with the common market. See EC Merger Regulation preamble, % 15, supra note 35,
at 15. Conversely, high market shares will create a presumption of dominance. See
Commission Decision 97/277, 1997 O.J. (L 110) 53, $ 106 (Case No. IV/M.784)
[hereinafter Kesko/Tuko].
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1994).
47 See supra note 29.
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may the transaction be abandoned. 48 Seldom is a merger case
litigated to this point. The Supreme Court has not decided a
merger case on the merits since 1974.49 The dramatic changes
that have occurred since 1977, have come without the Court's
supervision, and with relatively slight involvement of the Courts
of Appeals. As a practical matter, merger policy is almost
exclusively in the hands of the two federal enforcement agencies.
Their policies are embodied in the Merger Guidelines, which
have changed dramatically over time50 and have played a
significant role, even in court decisions.51 Because the action or
inaction of the enforcement agencies is generally determinative,
transparency with respect to merger policy is provided by their
Guidelines, which, as a practical matter, are coming closer and
closer to being rules.
48 For example, the merger of Staples and Office Depot was abandoned after
consent-decree negotiations and the FTC's success in court in obtaining a
preliminary injunction. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
49 The last antitrust case decided on the merits was United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The decision in United States v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975), while substantive, was of little general applicability.
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), deals with issues of
antitrust injury and standing. The absence of U.S. Supreme Court decisions may
reflect the Court's own disinclination to disturb the rulings of lower courts, but is
also reflective of the decline in antitrust litigation generally, and particularly in
section seven cases. See generally Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation:
The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1998).
50 The Department of Justice issued its first Merger Guidelines in 1968. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 13,101 [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES]. A totally new set of
Merger Guidelines was issued in 1982. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER
GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,102 [hereinafter
1982 MERGER GUIDELINES]. The 1982 Guidelines established the pattern followed
in subsequent versions and were a major change from the Guidelines issued in
1968. See generally Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion,
Efficiency, and Failure, 71 CAL. L. REV. 497 (1983) (discussing the 1982 Merger
Guidelines). Another set of Guidelines was issued in 1984. See U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,103 [hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES]. In 1992, the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission for the first time issued a joint set of guidelines,
limited this time to horizontal mergers. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
42. The 1992 Merger Guidelines were amended with respect to treatment of
efficiencies in 1997. All of these guidelines may be found in 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) % 13,100-13,104.
51 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the 1992 Merger Guidelines); United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908
F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying the 1984 Merger Guidelines); United States
v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the 1984
Merger Guidelines).
2000]
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The situation of the European Commission is somewhat
different. Until mid-1998, when the Court of Justice decided the
Kali + Salz case,52 the Commission had formulated its approach
to mergers virtually without judicial involvement. As in the
United States, mergers likely to be objected to by the
Commission are often "fixed" by consensual undertakings
accepted by the Commission as a solution to the competitive
problems it identified. 53 Unlike the enforcement agencies in the
United States, the Commission has applied its policies without
the issuance of guidelines. Transparency, then, must come
primarily from its own published decisions and statements.
Unlike the American enforcement agencies, the Commission
issues a letter notifying the parties when it concludes a Phase 1
investigation.54 These letters are publicly available and do
provide at least some clues as to the Commission's thinking.55
This of course is hardly an option for the U.S. agencies. The
Commission is notified only with respect to mergers above
relatively high threshold levels. American agencies, on the other
hand, are notified of virtually all mergers. Thus, the number of
notifications received by the EC in eight years is far less than
our agencies receive in six months. It is wholly unrealistic to
expect our agencies to respond with some kind of formal
document every time they conclude that a merger raises no
significant competitive threat. Guidelines are in a sense an
alternative to that, and are probably the best we can do, at least
if the agencies themselves follow them. In one sense, EC merger
52 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829.
53 See supra note 41. In the EC, a Commission decision finding a merger
acceptable because of undertakings made by the parties may still be subject to
challenge by non-parties. See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1396,
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 851-852, % 28-29. For example, the Commission's decision in
Kali + Salz although dealing with the market of Germany, was nonetheless
successfully challenged by the French government. See id.
54 Under the Merger Regulation, the Commission must make the decision to
initiate a full proceeding within one month of the receipt of notification from the
parties. See EC Merger Regulation art. 10, 1, supra note 35, at 20. Most cases are
closed at the end of this so-called Phase 1 period. Phase 2 proceedings initiated after
this initial examination involve a full investigation.
55 The notices are published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities ("O.J."), and are printed in full text in the EEC MERGER CONTROL
REPORTER (Kluwer 2000) along with the decisions following Phase 2 proceedings.
Decisions alter full proceedings are cited to the "L" series of the Official Journal of




policy is less transparent than that of American agencies,
lacking the coherent, single statement which guidelines provide.
The Commission, however, may in fact provide a better sense of
what is really going on because it explains non-action as well as
action.
In the end, the process of the EC is relatively similar to the
process in the United States. While American commentators
have been prone to characterize the EC system as regulatory and
the U.S. system as a process of law enforcement, this distinction
is largely illusory.56 Both in the U.S. and the EC, merger policy
is almost exclusively in the hands of the enforcement agencies.
In the U.S. few government cases are litigated and, except for an
occasional case filed by a state Attorney General, few other
merger cases go to court. Tightening of standing and antitrust
injury requirements has made it virtually impossible for private
parties to challenge mergers in court.57
While the situation under EC merger policy is similar, the
Commission's notifications are to some extent different, with
respect to timing and content.58 The Commission may seek
information from different sources, placing heavier weight than
the U.S. does on the views of competitors.5 9 Parties before the
56 The EC process may, in many respects, seem more regulatory than our own,
given the fact that the Commission is both prosecutor and, in most cases, the final
arbiter. Moreover, the Commission is charged with the formulation and
implementation of a broad range of economic policies and is thus, in a sense, acting
in a more "political" sense than is true in the United States. In the United States,
the enforcement of section seven is also perceived as highly regulatory, at least in
the sense that "rules" of the agencies tend to be outcome determinative and are
applied in a manner suggesting a broad range of discretion. See Thomas E. Kauper,
The Justice Department and the Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 105-13 (1990).
57 The decisions in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477
(1977), and Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), make it
extremely difficult for a competitor to establish the requisite "antitrust injury"
necessary to maintain a suit. In the rare case when there is a substantial likelihood
that the acquisition will result in predatory conduct, however, a suit can be
maintained. See HERBERT HOVENKA2vDP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 16.3a, at 544-47 (1994).
5S The requirements regarding the content of the notification to the
Commission are set out in Form Correlating to the Notification of a Concentration
Pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No. 4064189 (Form CO), reprinted in EEC Merger
Control Reporter, Part A, at 31 (Kluwer 1998).
59 The parties involved in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger objected
throughout to the role played by Airbus during the Commission's investigation. See
infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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Commission do not have the option of obtaining early judicial
input through preliminary injunction proceedings. In this sense,
the Commission may appear to have even greater control over
the development of merger policy than its American
counterparts. Private actions as such do not exist, although the
Court of Justice may permit somewhat greater latitude in
allowing customers or even third parties to challenge
Commission action.60 Furthermore, member states may need to
be consulted.61 In the end, however, merger policy formulation is
largely in the hands of the Commission.
There is, however, one important difference that should be
noted here, not because it has resulted in different outcomes, but
because it has the potential to do so. Both the Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission have functioned relatively
free of interference or influence by other government agencies
charged with trade policy or other elements of national economic
or industrial policy.62 The FTC is independent of the Executive
Branch, and the Antitrust Division has been successful in
characterizing itself as simply engaged in law enforcement and
not economic policy making.63 The European Commission, on
the other hand, is charged with responsibility for virtually all of
the economic policies of the Community.64 The Commission,
60 The criterion governing the ability of a third party to seek annulment of a
decision of the Commission under the Merger Regulation is set forth in Comit6
Central d'Entreprise de la Socidt6 Anonyme Vittel v. Commission, T-12193, 1995
E.R.C. II 1247 (Nestl6).
61 Consultation with a member state Advisory Committee is required before the
Commission undertakes any action against a merger. See EC Merger Regulation
art. 19, % 3, supra note 35, at 23.
62 See Thomas E. Kauper, Politics and the Justice Department: A View from the
Trenches, 9 J.L. & POL. 257, 258 (1993) (describing the Antitrust Division's
independence from undue influence by other federal agencies).
63 This stance is aided to a substantial degree by Court suggestions that the
sole concern of our antitrust laws is anti-competitive effects. See National Soc'y of
Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). This limitation to an examination of adverse
competitive effects has made it easier for the agencies to rebuff claims from others
within government based on other social or economic policies. See Calkins, supra
note 49, at 35.
64 See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation Between the European
Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933, 936-37
(1996) (explaining that the European Commission Council has authority under the
Treaty of Rome to adopt important regulatory texts); see also Mark Mildred,
Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
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therefore, can easily interject other policy concerns, such as
employment or trade effects, or even less specific political
concerns into its merger analysis.6 5 Whether it has actually done
so is difficult for an outsider to determine. Because of the
potential influence that such external pressures can have on EC
decision-making, however, the criticism of the Commission's
approach to the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case as trade policy
oriented or, more pejoratively, protectionist, has at least the ring
of plausibility.66 The Commission may also find itself caught
between the tugs and pulls of its member states, as was true in
Kali + Salz.6 7 This may interject other "political" or industrial
policy in a way in which the U.S. is unfamiliar.
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF MERGER POLICY: THE U.S. AND EC
COMPARED
All this is by way of prelude to the real question. Does EC
merger policy differ substantively in significant ways from U.S.
CHANGE 433,435 (1997) (discussing the implementation of the 1985 EU directive on
product liability law).
65 The Commission has explicitly noted that the Merger Regulation requires it
to carry out its appraisals of mergers within the framework of the basic objectives of
the Treaty of Rome and that these objectives include social, regional, and
environmental concerns. In its words, "[s]ubject to the objective of ensuring effective
competition, the Commission can therefore assess competitive conditions and in
particular apply the test of dominance in a flexible way which takes account, as far
as possible, of other Community objectives." REPORT FROM THE COMM~iISSION TO THE
COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MERGER REGULATION, COM (93) 385 (28
July 1993) at 20 [hereinafter REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL].
The President of the German Cartel Office, Dieter Wolf, among others, has called
for the creation of an "independent European competition authority," in part,
because of his belief that the Commission's application of competition policy should
be freed from its concern over integration of the European market and the resulting
politicization of the process. See Dieter Wolf, The Reform of EU Competition Law:
Member State Perspectives, 1996 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 169, 170-71 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1997). The proposal, aimed at removing "political" matters from
judgments about competition issues, has been discussed from time to time. See
Patrick Massey, Reform of EC Competition Law: Substance, Procedure and
Institutions, 1996 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 91, 121-22 (Barry Hawk ed., 1997);
Miguel A. Fernndez Ord6fiez, Enforcement by National Authorities of European
Community and Member States' Antitrust Law, 1993 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST.
629, 631-33 (Barry Hawk ed., 1994) (discussing the "insufficient independence" of
the antitrust authority in the European Commission).
6 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
67 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1392, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at
847-48, % 19 (stating that the French government challenged the Commission's
decision to permit the acquisition of a former state-owned East German potash
producer by the dominant German potash producer).
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policy? If so, how, and will these differences persist? This
section will focus on horizontal mergers, for they form the bulk of
the work of both U.S. and EC enforcement agencies.
On the face of it, very significant differences might be
expected. American merger policy rests on the general language
of section seven of the Clayton Act, which condemns any
acquisition where the effect "may be substantially to lessen
competition."68 From the amendment of section seven in the
1950s to the present time, we have been concerned with mergers
that enhance the likelihood of collusion, actual or tacit.
Combined with theories of interdependent or oligopoly pricing
where concentration is high, the base concern has consistently
been with price setting by groups of firms. Only in the past
several years has there been any focus on the so-called unilateral
effects doctrine.69 The bedrock of American merger policy has
been the fear that mergers that increase concentration
significantly will facilitate collusion, actual or tacit, between the
merged firm and the other firms in the market.70
The EC's Merger Regulation, on the other hand, appears to
have a more specific focus, prohibiting any merger "which
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the
common market or in a substantial part of it."71 Thus, the
Merger Regulation appears to have a more limited scope,
directed solely to the creation or strengthening of the dominant
position of a single firm. While the U.S. enforcement agencies
seem to be more concerned with the enhancement and exercise of
collective market power, the EC appears to focus on the
68 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
69 See infra note 133.
70 This emphasis on the facilitation of collusion as the measure of harm in
horizontal merger cases is deeply rooted in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. See
United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (noting that
competition is likely to be greater when there are many sellers, none of which
maintain a significant share of the market). The 1968, 1982, and 1984 Merger
Guidelines all describe the danger of horizontal mergers in such terms, while the
1992 Merger Guidelines take two different approaches. See supra note 50
(discussing the evolution of the Merger Guidelines). The first is focused on explicit
or implicit coordination in markets with few firms. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 42, § 2.1. The other is directed toward concerns over unilateral effects.
See id. §2.2. As stated by Professor Hovenkamp, "[today the principal concern of
merger policy is that horizontal mergers may facilitate express or tacit collusion or
Cournot-style oligopoly behavior." HOVENKANP, supra note 57, § 12.1b, at 445.
71 EC Merger Regulation art. 2, % 3, supra note 35, at 17.
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concentration of power by single firms. Furthermore, while the
authority of the Merger Regulation does not rest solely on the
condemnation in Article 86 of an "abuse of a dominant
position,"72 the language of the Regulation does seem to be closer
to the language of Article 86 than to that of Article 85,73 which
deals expressly with collective activity.74 Indeed, the Merger
Regulation could be read more narrowly than Article 86.75 An
immediate word of caution, however, is in order. Even if the EC
focus were entirely on the dominant position of a single firm, and
today it clearly is not 7 6 it would be a mistake to suggest that the
Merger Regulation is confined to the kind of "merger to
monopoly" that might be unlawful under the prohibitions of
section two of the Sherman Act governing monopolizing
conduct. 77 The distinction here rests largely on the fact that the
thresholds for finding a dominant position under Article 86 may
be significantly lower than the measures of monopoly power
under section two of the Sherman Act.78
However "dominant position" is defined, the language of the
Merger Regulation suggests that the Commission is likely to
measure competitive harm in terms of injury to competitors.
The Commission appears to be primarily concerned with the
72 EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 86; see also supra note 34 and accompanying
text (discussing Article 86).
73 See EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 85.
74 In Kali + Salz, the Court of Justice stated clearly that the Merger Regulation
is designed to give effect to the principles of both Articles 85 and 86. See Kali + Salz,
supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1497-98, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 932, % [153].
75 Unlike Article 86, which speaks of abuses "by one or more undertakings" of a
dominant position, EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 86, the Merger Regulation refers
only to "a dominant position." EC Merger Regulation art. 2, 2, supra note 35, at
17. It was this absence of any reference to collective dominance which the French
government relied on in Kali + Salz to support its argument that the Merger
Regulation does not encompass "oligopolistic" or "collective" dominance. See Kali +
Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1428-44, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 883-99, % 99-
130.
76 See Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision on the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation
in the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029, 1038 n.40 (1998) (discussing the
European Commission's interpretation of the Merger Regulation to "prevent the
creation or strengthening not just of a dominant position held by a single firm but
also of a dominant position held jointly by a number of firms"); see also Spencer
Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV.
343, 354 (1997) (arguing that the European Common Market condemns "the abusive
use of dominant market positions").
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
78 See infra note 114.
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potential exclusionary effects a merger could create, which in
turn could diminish the ability of competitors to compete.
Conversely, in the United States, harm is measured more
directly in terms of output and price effects felt by consumers,
not the competitors of the dominant firm.7 9 Moreover, the
Commission's focus on the strengthening of a dominant position
also makes it more difficult to take productive efficiencies into
account. After all, mergers that create substantial efficiencies
may also strengthen a dominant position. The language of the
Merger Regulation appears to leave little room for asserting an
efficiency justification where the merger would result in the
strengthening of a dominant position. Indeed, the Regulation
may go even further, finding a dominant position strengthened
precisely because efficiencies are created.
If these conjectures based simply on the language of the
Merger Regulation prove to be correct, EC and U.S. merger
policy would be substantially different, both in their analysis of
competitive harm and recognition of cognizable defenses.
Whether this is so, and to what degree, requires an analysis of
merger policy as actually applied. This article will now examine
these questions more specifically.
A. An Analysis of Competitive Harm
From the beginning of the application of section seven of the
Clayton Act, the focus of merger policy in the United States has
been on the likelihood of actual or tacit collusion in markets
characterized by high market concentrations.80  Two
fundamental ideas have predominated in applying section seven
of the Clayton Act. First, actual collusion is more likely to occur
and to be effective when the number of firms in the industry is
relatively small. Second, even without express collusion,
oligopolistic markets and interdependent pricing, which are
likely to accompany such market structures, are more likely to
result in higher prices and lower outputs than unconcentrated
79 See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 10 (1997) ("[The Department is concerned only with adverse effects on
competition that would harm U.S. consumers by reducing output or raising prices."
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1998), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1391, at S-21 (Spec. Supp. Nov. 17, 1988))).
8o See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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markets. These two propositions have been the bedrock of
merger policy since the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank.8 ' In Philadelphia
National Bank, the Court determined that when a merger
produces "a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market," there is a presumption of
illegality.82 The Court further found that a combined market
share of thirty percent was sufficient to give rise to such a
presumption.8 3 What followed was a series of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions between 1963 and the 1974 decision in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.8 4 that had the effect of
elevating this presumption to a virtual rule of law, which placed
extraordinary emphasis on market definition and the spurious
concept of relevant "submarkets." 5 The low point came in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,86 where the Court condemned
an acquisition resulting in a combined market share of seven
and one-half percent.8 7
In General Dynamics, the Court retrenched, finding that
static market shares were not an accurate reflection of future
market power, and that the presumption of illegality, which the
government had established upon a showing of combined market
shares in the range of fifteen percent, was therefore rebutted.88
The elevation of the market share presumption to a virtual rule
of law thus came to an end. General Dynamics is the Supreme
Court's last word on the subject, a fact that is as lamentable as it
is astonishing. Today, these decisions are looked at with a
degree of wonderment. They are, with the exceptions of
Philadelphia National Bank and General Dynamics, in a real
sense, antiques.
81 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
82 Id. at 363.
83 See id. at 364
84 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
85 Among the intervening horizontal merger decisions were United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); and United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
86 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
87 See id. at 272-74.
88 See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 486.
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These results would not follow today, either here or in the
European Community. Any comparison between these early
decisions and the approach in the EC would suggest that EC
merger policy is lenient indeed. But this of course is not an apt
comparison, for things in the United States have changed
dramatically, without guidance from the Supreme Court. Rather
than being limited to its facts, as it easily could have been,
General Dynamics was taken by the lower courts and the
enforcement agencies as an open invitation to substantially
reformulate merger policy without, however, departing from its
core concern with collusion. Relying on the consumer welfare
standard adopted in a series of Supreme Court decisions dealing
with conduct other than mergers, some of which set aside earlier
precedent,8 9 the courts and agencies have worked a kind of
revolution in merger analysis, resulting in decisions like United
States v. Waste Management, Inc.90 and United States v. Baker
Hughes, Inc.91 At the heart of this change is the series of Merger
Guidelines issued by the agencies. 92 These Guidelines reflect
significant shifts in thinking and have influenced the courts,
guided enforcement policy, and are more often than not, outcome
determinative. They may be taken today as a comprehensive
statement of American merger policy. Comparisons between
U.S. and EC merger policy can fairly begin with the 1992
89 The two most significant of these non-merger cases of the late 1970s were
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 37-38
(1979) (applying to legality of blanket licensing of a copyright), and Continental
T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977) (applying to legality of
vertical non-price restrictions), which overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Both of these decisions moved antitrust doctrine in the
direction of an efficiency-based consumer welfare standard-a standard that is
reflected in all of the Merger Guidelines since 1982.
90 743 F.2d 976, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding an acquisition even though it
resulted in a market share in excess of 50% because entry into the market was
easy).
91 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that "[elvidence of market
concentration simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into
future competitiveness"); see also United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F.
Supp. 669, 679-81 (D. Minn. 1990) (indicating that despite the increase in
concentration, the merger was not likely to lessen competition); United States v.
Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07 (D.N.J. 1985) (concluding that despite the
high concentration of the merged firms, the government is not likely to establish a
section seven violation).
92 See supra note 50.
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Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the Department
of Justice and the FTC.93
The 1992 Guidelines continue to stress the avoidance of
collusion as the primary concern with horizontal mergers,
although the interjection of a concern over unilateral effects, an
analysis that continues to mystify some of us, has muddied the
waters a bit.94 The unilateral effects doctrine has yet to be
tested in any real way through litigation.95 Whatever else one
thinks of it, the analysis is still focused on output and price
effects.
While the framework of analysis set forth in the Guidelines
is probably well known, it is useful to summarize the process.
Under the Guidelines, markets must be defined in product 96 and
geographic terms.97 Market shares and concentration levels, as
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are
calculated.98 The HHI gives great weight to disparity in firm
size, being substantially higher when there are one or two firms
with market shares significantly higher than those of the other
firms in the market.99 Market share data will be interpreted
taking into account factors that suggest that shares based on
historic data either understate or overstate the future
significance of the merged firm.100 These are the so-called
General Dynamics factors' 01 that were critical in the FTC's
conclusions in Boeing-McDonnell Douglas.10 2
93 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42.
94 See infra note 123.
95 The unilateral effects approach of the Guidelines has been considered but
rejected factually in several cases. See Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1582 (D. Del. 1995); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926
F. Supp. 321,366 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
96 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.1.
97 See id. § 1.2.
98 See id. § 1.5.
99 See id.
100 See id. §1.52-1.522.
101 In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the Court
found that the combined market share of the merging coal companies was
sufficiently high to create a presumption of illegality. That presumption, however,
was rebutted by a showing that the acquired company lacked uncommitted coal
reserves and had little opportunity to acquire more. See id. at 510-11. The General
Dynamics factors are sometimes referred to as the "failing firm" defense. See
Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga in Boeing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 24,295 (FTC July 1, 1997).
102 In Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, the FTC found that the failure of McDonnell
Douglas to improve the technology and efficiency of its aircraft caused its "prospects
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The Guidelines create a safe harbor when the post
acquisition HHI is below 1000.103 When the HHI exceeds 1800,
it is presumed that the merger is anti-competitive.104 When the
HHI is between 1000 and 1800, there is no presumption of
illegality and analysis rests on a variety of other factors-factors
that may also lead to a rebuttal of the presumption at the above
1800 level. 10 5 These factors may be characterized as (1) the
presence or absence of elements that go to the detection and
punishment of firms that deviate from a pattern of coordinated
interaction, including homogeneity of product, a pattern of
product standardization and/or information exchanges,
frequency of orders, and size of buyers;10 6 (2) ease of entry by
committed entrants sufficient to restrain price increases when
such entry could be reasonably exacted within about two
years; 10 7 (3) the creation of internal efficiencies; 08 and (4) the
imminent failure of one of the merging firms.10 9 Ease of entry is
a trump card; no merger, whatever the HHI numbers, will be
challenged when entry is easy. The failing company defense is
likewise absolute.
Much could be said about the Guidelines' approach and the
approach employed by the courts in the relatively few cases that
for future commercial aircraft [to become] virtually non-existent." Boeing Co., 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 24,295 (FTC July 1, 1997).
103 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.51(a) (stating that
markets with a post-merger HFHI below 1000 are "unconcentrated" and that
"[miergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse
competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis").
104 See id. § 1.51(c). Markets with a post-merger HHI above 1800 are considered
"highly concentrated." Id. In highly concentrated markets, "[miergers producing an
increase in the HHI of more than 50 points... raise significant competitive
concerns." Id. Furthermore, "[wihere the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, it will be
presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points
are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise." Id.
105 See id. § 1.51(b). Mergers with a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800
are "moderately concentrated." Id. In moderately concentrated markets, "[miergers
producing an increase in the HHIl of less than 100 points... are unlikely to have
adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis." Id.
Mergers that produce an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points, however,
"potentially raise significant competitive concerns." Id. The competitive concerns
created when the post-merger HHI is above 1000, however, are balanced by several
other factors. See id. §§ 2-5.
106 See id. § 2.1.
107 See id. § 3.
108 See id. § 4.
109 See id. § 5.1.
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have been litigated over the past decade. For present purposes,
it is enough to say that the courts have accepted the basic
approach of the Guidelines. There has, however, been some
disagreement over several details. For example, in several
prominent cases, the courts have found entry easy and thus have
allowed mergers with high market shares, even though the
enforcement agencies would not have done so.110 With rare
exceptions, over the last fifteen years virtually no mergers have
been challenged by the agencies when the post-acquisition HHI
was below 1800 or when combined markets shares were under
thirty percent.' While the analysis begins with market shares
and concentration data, other factors, all directed to the question
of the likelihood of successful actual or tacit collusion between
the merged firms and other firms in the market, will be taken
into account.112 Among these factors are market transparency,
110 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
111 Two exceptions include Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381,
1384 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the combined market share was 26% but four firm
concentration ratio after merger would increase to 91%) and In re Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 115 F.T.C. 1010, 1273 (1992) (indicating a post-acquisition BHI in
mass and suspension PVC market of about 1300).
112 In a series of other decisions, the Commission applied the concept of
oligopolistic dominance but while finding that such dominance appeared to exist,
cleared the transaction anyway. In Mercedes-BenzIKdssborher, infra note 131, the
Commission found that the oligopoly of the top three firms would be checked by
future entry. Somewhat similarly, in Krupp IThyssen /Riva lFalck / Tadfin AST, the
Commission discussed collective dominance between the top two post-merger firms
and among the top five post-merger firms. As to the latter, the Commission found
that the market shares of the top five firms were sufficiently disparate that parallel
behavior would be difficult, particularly because the industry was marked by
considerable excess capacity. Looking only at the top two post-merger firms whose
combined market share was 55%-70%, the remaining competitors had sufficient
strength to restrain the ability of the putative duopolists to act independently. More
striking are the decisions in Pilkington-Techint/S1V, infra note 131, and
Mannesman/ValloureclIlva, infra note 131. In Pilkington-Techint, the Commission
examined concentration levels of the top five firms in the market. After noting that
the transaction in question would increase the degree of concentration in an already
highly concentrated market with high entry barriers and that there were strong
incentives to engage in anticompetitive parallel behavior, the Commission cleared
the transaction because there were significant excess capacities, asymmetries in
market shares, little market transparency, and in one segment of the market, large
powerful buyers. Thus, whatever the incentives to anticompetitive parallel behavior,
it was not likely to occur. This was despite the fact that on two past occasions firms
in the market had been found guilty of cartel behavior. In Mannesmann, the
Commission concluded that while there were strong incentives for the top two firms
that would hold 70% of the post-merger market to engage in anticompetitive
parallel behavior because the market was highly transparent and other firms in the
market had neither the possibility nor the inclination to significantly constrain the
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homogeneity of product, and buyer characteristics." 3  The
General Dynamics factors have been given considerable weight
in assessing market shares, both by the agencies and the
courts." 4 Ease of entry has resulted in the allowance of a
number of mergers where market shares and HHIs were very
high." 5 Economic analysis has now come to the forefront with
economists in the agencies playing a major, if not predominant,
role in deciding whether a merger should be challenged. We
have come a long way since Von's Grocery."6 What is driving the
change more than anything else is the perception that many, if
not most, mergers are efficiency-enhancing, a fact that has come
to the forefront with the need to permit American firms to be
competitive in international markets. Neatly coinciding with
this need has been the shift away from the populist antitrust
regime of the 1960s, a regime in which courts seemed prepared
to use the antitrust laws to protect small enterprises even at the
cost of inefficiency." 7 It was a regime that could no longer be
afforded.
How does merger analysis in the EC differ? The
Commission begins as the U.S. does, with product and
geographic market definition and the derivation of market share.
top two firms, the transaction was not likely to result in a strengthening of a
dominant position. Any significant price increase would provoke further entry by
Japanese producers. The decision is of particular interest because the Commission
reached this conclusion in the face of statements by existing domestic competitors
that they would follow the lead of the top two firms in setting prices.
113 See, e.g., In re B.F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207, 315-17 (1983) (discussing
product homogeneity and market transparency); Occidental Petroleum Co., 115
F.T.C. at 1250-64 (same). Size and sophistication of buyers have been elements
considered in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908
F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that the sophistication of the buyers "was
likely to promote competition even in a highly concentrated market"); United States
v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (noting
that "[tihe existence of large, powerful buyers of a product mitigates against the
ability of sellers to raise prices"). Size and sophistication of buyers is also significant
because the presence of large knowledgeable buyers creates a strong incentive for
members of a cartel or oligopoly to cheat on the cartel or oligopoly price. See 1992
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 2.1-2.12.
114 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 1.52-1.522. Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas is the best recent example of the application of these factors.
See Boeing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 24,295 (FTC July 1, 1997).
115 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
117 See generally Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust
Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1968)
(discussing the impact of the Warren Court on antitrust law).
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If the EC were to define markets more narrowly than the U.S.
does, different outcomes might be expected. The Commission
has been sharply criticized in the past for the use of narrow
market definitions in Article 86 cases.118 There is, however, little
difference between market definition under the Merger
Regulation and section seven of the Clayton Act. 119  One
difference is that the Commission does not generally consider
supply substitutability as part of market definition, in contrast
to the conventional market analysis in the United States.120
This is not a significant difference, however, because the
Commission does consider supply substitutability in its
assessment of potential entry.121 The tendency to define markets
in national terms, as opposed to EC terms, has diminished as the
EC succeeds in breaking down national legal and regulatory
barriers.122 Today, many markets are defined as EC-wide, or
even wider.1' American lawyers and economists should be
perfectly comfortable with the process.
The significance of combined market shares in EC analysis,
however, is not altogether the same as in the United States,
largely because the Commission's concept of competitive harm
differs significantly from our own. The Merger Regulation
identifies harm as the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position. 24 This, in turn, has been identified as the ability of the
firm(s) involved to act independently from other firms.125 While
118 See, e.g., VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRACTICE 79-87 (6th ed. 1997) (discussing the ways in which the EC
defines relevant markets); Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals, and
Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the
European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 461-79 (1996) (same).
119 See Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition Under EC
Competition Law, 20 FORDHAMI INTL L.J. 1682 (1997), for a detailed discussion of
the approach to market definition under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty and
the Merger Regulation. The European Commission has since issued guidelines
applicable in defining relevant markets. See Commission Notice on the Definition of
Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C
372) 5.
120 See Kauper, supra note 119, at 1745-47, 1767.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 1726-33.
20 See id. at 1750-63.
m24 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
125 Decisions under the Merger Regulation routinely refer to single firm
dominance as the ability "to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors and its customers." Commission Decision 96/222, 1996 O.J. (L 75) 38,
52, I 83 (Case No. IV/M.603 Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox) [hereinafter
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it is true that firms might be able to act independently of each
other because they have colluded, this is not the primary
meaning attached to independence by the Commission.
From the outset, the Commission has struggled with the
question of whether the concept of dominance was limited to an
assessment of the power of a single firm. Did the merger, in
short, create or strengthen a dominant position in the merging
parties themselves? Is this the only circumstance condemned by
the Merger Regulation, or does it also extend to the creation or
strengthening of collective dominance by the merging firm and
one or more other firms? This has been perhaps the most critical
substantive question the Commission has faced.
As early as its decision in Nestld/Perrier,126 the Commission
gave the Merger Regulation a broader reach by interpreting it to
cover "oligopolistic dominance."127 The Commission's language
in that case sounds much like that used in American cases based
on the idea that high concentration is likely to result in supra-
competitive pricing through interdependent decision making.128
Its decision rested, in part, on the Commission's observation that
other countries, including several of its own member states,
apply their merger controls to prevent the threat of oligopolistic
behavior. 129 The Commission did not believe that these member
states would have surrendered their control over large mergers
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission if, as a result,
acquisitions subject to their own rules based on fears of
oligopolistic pricing could not be reached by the Commission.180
Following Nestli/Perrier, the Commission persisted in its view of
oligopolistic dominance. 131 Finally, over the objections of France
Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox]. Interestingly, the Court of Justice used the
same standard in examining a post-merger duopoly. See Kali + Salz, supra note 9,
1998 E.C.R. at 1-1519, 4 C.M.L.R. at 947, [221] (stating that the alleged duopoly
would be "able to adopt a common policy on the market and act to a considerable
extent independently of their competitors, their customers, and also of consumers").
126 Commission Decision 92/553, 1992 O.J. (L 356) 1 (Case No. IV/M.190
Nestld/Perrier) [hereinafter Nestl6/Perrier].
127 See id. at 24, % 110-31.
128 See id. at 24, 110-14.
129 See id. at 24-25, 115.
130 See id.
131 There have been numerous Commission decisions applying the concept of
collective dominance. See Commission Decision 99/152, 1999 O.J. (L 50) 27, 40-41,
95-97 (Case IV/M.1016 Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand) [hereinafter Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand]; Commission Decision 97/25, 1997 O.J. (L 11) 1, 24
131 (Case No. IV/M.580 ABB/Daimler-Benz) [hereinafter ABB/Daimler-Benz];
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but with the support of Germany, the Commission's position was
accepted in large part just two years ago by the European Court
of Justice in Kali + Salz.'3 2 With objections to the general
concept of "collective dominance," now rejected by the Court of
Justice, the merger policy of the EC appears to have moved into
much closer conformity with American merger control. While
this is clearly true, significant differences remain.133
Commission Decision 97/26, 1997 O.J. (L 11) 30, 52, 140-42 (Case No. IV/M.619
Gencor/Lonrho) [hereinafter Gencor/Lonrho]; Commission Decision 95/354, 1995
O.J. (L 211) 1, 20 101-04 (Case No. IV/M.477 Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer)
[hereinafter Mercedes-Benz/Kdssbohrer]; Commission Decision 95/421, 1995 O.J. (L
251) 18, 28-29, 68 (Case No. IV/M.484 Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/TadfIAST)
[hereinafter Krupp/Thyssen]; Kali + Salz Commission Decision, supra note 9, 1994
O.J. (L 186) at 47-48, I 57-63; Commission Decision 94/208, 1994 O.J. (L 102) 15,
24, %% 53-54 (Case No. IV/M.315 Mannesmann/VallourecIlva) [hereinafter
MannesmannlVallourecdIlva; Commission Decision 94359, 1994 O.J. (L 158) 24,
37-38, 91 52-56 (Case No. IV/M.358 Pilkington-Techint/SIV) [hereinafter
Pilkington-TechintSIV]. The first case to rest on a collective dominance analysis
was a decision not under the Merger Regulation but under Article 86. See
Commission Decision 89/93, 1989 O.J. (L 33) 44, 65 IT 78-82 (Case No. IV/31 Flat
Glass) (SocietA Italiana Vetro-SIV SpA/Fabbrica Pisana SpA/Vernante Pennitalia
SpA) [hereinafter Italian Flat Glass]. The Commission's approach in Italian Flat
Glass was sustained by the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T-68/69 & T-77-
78/89, Italian Flat Glass: Societb Italiana Vetro SpA v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R.
3147, 5 C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance 1992). For a general discussion see Derek
Ridyard, Joint Dominance and the Oligopoly Blind Spot Under the EC Merger
Regulation, 13 EUI. COMPETITION L. REV. 161 (1992); Barry J. Rodger, The
Oligopoly Problem and the Concept of Collective Dominance: EC Developments in the
Light of U.S. Trends in Antitrust Law and Policy, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 25 (1995/96);
Antoine Winckler & Marc Hansen, Collective Dominance Under the EC Merger
Control Regulation, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 787 (1993).
132 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829.
13 Beginning with the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the enforcement agencies have
developed a merger analysis that does not rest solely on the increased likelihood of
collusion. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42. The Merger Guidelines
now also look to the power the merged firm may itself have over its customers. See
id. §§ 2.2-2.22. This so-called unilateral effects analysis may come into play either
(1) when products are highly differentiated and a significant share of the sales of
the merging partners is accounted for by purchasers who view the products as their
first or second choices, and rivals' repositioning of product lives will not replace
sales to these purchasers; or (2) when products are undifferentiated and competition
is driven primarily by capacity. In either case, the merged firm may find it
profitable to raise the price to customers whose choices are limited even though
some sales are lost. For a fuller discussion see Roscoe B. Starek, III & Stephen
Stockum, What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive?: "Unilateral Effects" Analysis
Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 63 ANITRUST L.J. 801 (1995).
The question may be asked whether the unilateral effects analysis brings
American law closer to the dominance analysis of the EC. In some respects it does.
As in single firm dominance cases, the analysis does not rest on any inference or
proof of likely collusion. The Guidelines' unilateral effects threshold of a 35%
2000]
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To consider these differences, it is useful to consider cases of
single-firm dominance first, for these are the cases in which the
Commission's approach initially developed. The Commission's
analysis under the Merger Regulation is similar to that in
Article 86 cases involving a single firm's abuse of a dominant
position.134 Single-firm cases are not based on any increased
threat of collusion. The issue invariably raised in such cases is
whether the merged firms will be able to act, to a substantial
degree, independent of their rivals.
Most of the Commission's decisions in which objections to
mergers have been raised have rested on findings that the
acquisition would create or strengthen the position of a single
dominant firm. Many of these cases involve combined market
shares in excess of sixty percent, 135 although dominance has also
been found with market shares as low as forty-three percent. 36
Because dominance may be established with market shares
significantly lower than what the enforcement agencies would
normally define as a monopoly in the United States, the reach of
the Merger Regulation, even if confined to single-firm
dominance, would extend to many cases that would be thought
combined market share at least begins to approach the thresholds employed by the
EC in determining dominance. Because the response of rivals must be examined,
the unilateral effects analysis could lead to a direct examination of their strengths
and weaknesses. The analysis differs, however, from that employed by the
European Commission in several respects. The American unilateral effects analysis
is limited to particular types of cases. The European concept of dominance is more
generalized. Nor does unilateral effects focus on the impact of the merger on rivals.
The European Commission has frequently described brand preferences as barriers
to entry, but has not otherwise embraced the American unilateral effects standards.
134 This similarity is not surprising because it was believed that the Merger
Regulation was largely based on Article 86.
135 See Commission Decision 98/526, 1998 O.J. (L 234) 14 (Case No. IV/M.950
Hoffman-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim) [hereinafter Hoffman-La
Roche/Boehringer Mannheim]; Commission Decision 96/435, 1996 O.J. (L 183) 1
(Case No. IV/M.623 Kimberly-Clark/Scott) [hereinafter Kimberly-Clark/Scott];
Commission Decision 96/204, 1996 O.J. (L 66) 17 (Case IV/M.582 Orkla/Volvo)
[hereinafter Orkla/Volvo]; Commission Decision 941893, 1994 O.J. (L 354) 32 (Case
No. IV/M.430 Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz (II)) [hereinafter Procter &
Gamble/VP Schickedanz]; Commission Decision 92/385, 1992 O.J. (L 204) 1 (Case
No IV/M.126 Accor/Wagons-Lits) [hereinafter Accor/Wagons-Lits]; Commission
Decision 91/535, 1991 O.J. (L 290) 35 (Case No. IV/M068 Tetra PaktAlfa-Laval)
[hereinafter Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval].
136 See Commission Decision 96/346, 1996 O.J. (L 134) 32 (Case IVY/M.553
RTL[Veronica/Endemol) [hereinafter RTL/Veronica/Endemol]; Commission Decision
93/9, 1993 O.J. (L 7) 13 (Case No. IV/M214 DuPont/ICI) [hereinafter DuPont/ICI];
Commission Decision 91/595, 1991 O.J. (L 320) 26 (Case No. IV/MO12 VartaBosch).
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objectionable in the United States under an analysis
emphasizing the likelihood of collusion. After all, a combined
market share of fifty percent would indicate an HI far in excess
of the 1800 level, a level at which the Merger Guidelines indicate
an acquisition is likely to be found anti-competitive. 137
Nevertheless, an approach based entirely on single-firm
dominance would hardly reach all of the cases in which illegality
would likely be found in the United States under an approach
placing primary emphasis on the likelihood of actual or tacit
collusion.
Analysis in all Commission cases begins with market
definition and calculation of market shares. Market shares in
excess of the dominance thresholds create no more than a
presumption of dominance, much as in the United States.138
While not articulated as clearly as in the United States Merger
Guidelines, the Commission also considers a variety of other
factors. The size and power of buyers has been taken into
account, not as a barrier to collusion but in terms of
countervailing power.13 9  The most significant additional
elements, at least in single-firm dominance cases, have been
ease of entry and an assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of existing competitors including the likely impact
the proposed merger will have upon their continuing ability to
compete.
As in the United States, ease of entry is a virtual trump
card, permitting what otherwise would be objectionable
I7 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
= Very high market shares may establish prima facie dominance. See Tetra
Pak/Alfa-Laval, supra note 135, 1991 O.J. (L 290) at 41, § IV.B.3.3 ("A market share
as high as 90% is, in itself, a very strong indicator of the existence of a dominant
position."). Conversely, low market shares may be enough, without more, to lead the
Commission to allow a merger even without opening a full inquiry. See Commission
Notice, 1994 O.J. (C 178) 15 (Case No. IV/M.441 Daimler BenzfRWE); Commission
Notice, 1992 O.J. (C 228) 6 (Case No. IV/M.232 Pepsico/General Mills). When the
facts of the cases are not at either extreme, the Commission's analysis will typically
turn on evaluation of the factors further discussed in the text.
139 See Pilkington-Techint/SIV, supra note 131, 1994 O.J. (L 158) at 38, 56
(relying on buyer purchasing power in finding the merger in question
unobjectionable); see also Commission Decision 98/666, 1998 O.J. (L 316) 33, 46 H[
73-74 (Case No. IV/M.970 TKS/ITW Signode/Titan). More often, however, this
element has not been deemed sufficient to conclude that a dominant position will be
significantly constrained. See Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox, supra note
125, 1996 O.J. (L 75) at 49-50, 70-74; Nestld/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J.
(L 356) at 1-20, %J[ 77-89.
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mergers. i40 The analysis of ease of entry and the height of entry
barriers are, to a substantial degree, similar. Virtually every
decision finding a merger objectionable rests, in part, on findings
that entry barriers are high. Among other elements indicating
difficulty of entry have been lack of access to servicing and
distribution,' 4' established brand recognition, i 42  and the
presence in the industry of a variety of practices that, in the
broad terms used by American agencies, might be characterized
as exclusionary. These include extensive use of exclusive dealing
arrangements, fidelity rebates, and retail shelf space and freezer
arrangements. 43 Far more often than in the United States,
significant legal or regulatory barriers have been found to
impede entry. 44 This is largely because the efforts of the
Commission to harmonize these requirements, a key element to
market-wide integration, had in many markets not yet come into
140 See Mercedes-BenzKlssbohrer, supra note 131, 1995 O.J. (L 211) at 19-20,
%1 98-101 (stating that despite the increase in the merged firms total share, the
transaction will not lead to the creation of a dominant position because of ease of
entry); Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, supra note 131, 1994 O.J. (L 102) at 34-36,
109-24 (discussing the ability of other Japanese producers to enter the market).
141 See Commission Decision 93/466, 1993 O.J. (L 217) 35, 38-39, $1 26-30
(KNP/BT/VRG) (noting that the merger would "create a dominant position in the
markets of distribution and servicing of printing presses").
142 See, e.g., Nestl6/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 20, 89
(recognizing that retailers and wholesalers would not be able to constrain the
market power of the remaining "well-known brands"); see also Kimberly-
Clark/Scott, supra note 135, 1996 O.J. (L 183) at 30, 200-05 (stating that "[i]n
terms of assessing the likelihood of entry in the branded segment of the market, the
simple fact that these figures are relatively high must at least act to discourage the
entry of a new branded product"); Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, supra note
135, 1994 O.J. (L 354) at 53, 125-30 (commenting that brand loyalty is especially
hard to break consumers of, thus making it harder for potential competitors to enter
into a branded market).
143 See, e.g., Nestl6/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 21, 95 ("This
type of rebate strengthens the position of the established suppliers and raises the
barriers to entry for newcomers."); see also Commission Notice, 1994 O.J. (C 55) 05
(Case No. IV/M Unilever France/Ortiz/Miko (II)); Procter & Gamble/VP
Schickedanz, supra note 135, 1994 O.J. (L 354) at 56-57, 148 (explaining that new
members to the market will have a difficult time finding shelf space due to product
characteristics).
14 See Orkla/Volvo, supra note 135, 1996 O.J. (L 66) at 22, %% 44-49 ("There
are a number of regulatory barriers that hinder the development of imports into
Norway, and that, in any case, hamper seriously the price competitiveness of
imported beer into Norway."); Commission Decision 91/251, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48,
53-54, 43 (Case No. IV/M.042 Alcatel/Telettra). More commonly, legal and
regulatory barriers are taken into account in defining relevant markets. See
Kauper, supra note 119, at 1726-33.
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being, or if they had, were not yet effective. More commonly
than in the United States, the Commission examines entry in
terms of specific firms identified as most likely entrants, firms
either outside the geographic market or producing similar
products. The Commission has been known to query these firms
directly about their likely plans with respect to entry and future
conduct.14 In general, however, the Commission's entry analysis
is not unlike that set forth in U.S. Merger Guidelines, although
the Commission does not distinguish sharply between committed
and uncommitted entrants. 46
The weight which the Commission gives to the strength of
remaining competitors vis-A-vis the merged firm is a different
matter and reflects a merger policy significantly at odds with
U.S. policy. In the United States, it is assumed that when
concentration is high, remaining firms, except perhaps for a few
small firms on the fringe, 147 will find it profitable to collude
overtly or tacitly and will elect to do so. Because it is assumed
that they will join in the collusion or benefit from it, there is
little reason to examine their strength as a competitive
counterweight to the power of the merged entity. The nature of
these firms, their products, and past behavior go to the question
of whether collusion is likely to succeed. The European
Commission's approach, at least in single-firm dominance cases,
appears to proceed on the assumption that remaining firms will
not collude with the merged entity but will, if able, compete
directly to check the ability of the dominant firm to raise prices.
This leads directly to consideration of the strengths or
weaknesses of these firms and the impact of the merger on their
ability to compete. As stated by the Court of Justice in Kali +
Salz, "[tNo assess with a sufficient degree of probability the effect
which a concentration might have on competition on the relevant
145 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, supra note 135, 1994 O.J. (L
354) at 60-61, [I 175-81; Mannesmann/Vallourec/lva, supra note 131, 1994 O.J. (L
102) 34-36, 98-126.
14 Under the U.S. Merger Guidelines, firms that could enter a market quickly
without incurring significant sunk costs are treated as though they were in the
market for purposes of market definition. See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 42, § 10. So-called committed entrants-those that could enter only by
incurring such significant sunk costs-are dealt with separately in terms of likely
entry. See id. § 3.
147 See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1387-89 (7th Cir.
1986) (discussing the likely reaction of smaller firms to the merger and concluding
that they would be likely to collude).
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market, it is essential to rely on a rigorous analysis of the
competitors' weight."148  The court's decision annulled the
Commission's previous determination because of a failure to
show that a particular firm not involved in the merger with a
market share of about ten percent lacked "the necessary base to
maintain, let alone increase, its market share and thus exert
pressure on the alleged duopoly."149 The Commission did not
establish "that there is no effective counterweight" to the
duopoly firm's ability to set prices and output.150 Strengthening
of a dominant position, in short, generally comes at the expense
of competitors.
The emphasis on the ability of existing firms to check the
power of a dominant firm has led the Commission to conduct a
detailed examination of the financial strength, costs, capacity
limits, brand strengths, distribution systems, and customer
bases of the existing firms.151 Some of these same factors might
go to the likelihood of collusion, but at least in single-firm cases,
the Commission does not focus on this issue. Instead, the
Commission considers whether the merged firm can successfully
148 Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1525-26, 4 C.M.L.R. at 951,
[246].
149 Id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1526, 4 C.M.L.R. at 951, [247].
150 Id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1526, 4 C.M.L.R. at 951, [248].
151 There are various decisions finding that competitors would not likely be able
to check the market power of the dominant firm or firms. See ABB/Daimler-Benz,
supra note 131, 1997 O.J. (L 11) at 13, 64 (finding competitors lacked financial
strength needed for technology investment); Kesko/Tuko, supra note 45, 1997 O.J.
(L 110), 106-38 (considering lack of access to business premises, inability to use
similar customer loyalty plans, and lack of comparable buying power as factors of
merger analysis); Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox, supra note 125, 1996 O.J.
(L 75) at 46, 49, 52, 67 (finding competitors lacked sufficient capacity); Kimberly-
Clark/Scott, 1996 O.J. (L 183) at 19-23, 32, %% 128-57, 215 (finding competitors
lacked shelf space access and national brands); OrklafVolvo, supra note 135, 1996
O.J. (L 66) at 25-26, 61-68 (finding competitors lacked efficient distribution,
shelf space access, and national brands); Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, 1994
O.J. (L 354) at 60-61, 1% 175-178 (finding competitors lacked financial strength);
Commission Decision 94/811, 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48, 61 72 (Case No. IV/M.269
ShelllMontecatini) [hereinafter Shell/Montecatini] (considering disparity in
financial reserves, product lines, and access to technologies as factors of merger
analysis); Accor/Wagons-Lits, supra note 135, 1992 O.J. (L 204) at 8-9, % 25(4)
(considering disparate financial strengths as one factor of merger analysis);
Nestld/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 17-18, 75-76 (finding that
competitors lacked financial strength and a known brand name); Commission
Decision 91/619, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42, 54, 42 (Case No. IV/M.053 Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland) [hereinafter Aerospatiale-Aleniade Havilland] (finding
competitors lacked sales base).
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operate "independently."152 This approach, in turn, leads to the
question of whether there is an increased likelihood that the now
dominant firm may successfully engage in conduct that inhibits
remaining firms from expanding, or even holding, their market
shares-conduct that the U.S. might broadly characterize as
"exclusionary." Thus, for example, the Commission's emphasis
on disparate financial strength and market share suggests that
such strength might be used in some manner to exclude or
discipline rivals,153 much the same fear expressed in the now
discredited "deep pocket" theories occasionally used during the
1960s in the United States.154 The idea that a merger is anti-
competitive, i.e., that a dominant position may be strengthened,
by future conduct made more likely by the merger, is rooted in
the concept of "abuse" under Article 86 and could be taken as
embodied in the language of the Merger Regulation itself.
The focus on existing competitors has led the Commission to
consider not only their financial position, capacity, technological
capabilities, brand strengths, and customer bases, but also
conduct by the dominant firms which inhibits remaining firms
from expanding or even holding their market shares.155 Coupled
152 See Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox, supra note 125, 1996 O.J. (L 75)
at 52, %1 83.
153 See, e.g., ABB/Daimler-Benz, supra note 131, 1997 O.J. (L 11) at 24, % 131
(recognizing that narrowing of oligopoly to duopoly will increase the likelihood "of a
joint blocking strategy"); Keskof/uko, supra note 45, 1997 O.J. (L 110), [ 138
(noting that competitors are aware of how "Kesko could use this position against
them"); ShelllMontecatini, 1994 O.J. (L 332) at 66, 111 (finding that the merged
firm could use its financial position "to subsidize niche markets"). In some cases, the
Commission has stressed that with greater market share and financial strength, the
dominant firm or firms may be able to entrench their position by greater
investments in advertising or technology. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble/VP
Schickedanz, supra note 135, 1994 O.J. (L 354) at 56, 145 (finding that Procter &
Gamble has the ability to make greater advertising expenditures); DuPontJICI,
supra note 136, 1993 O.J. (L 7) at 21, 22 41, 47 (finding that DuPont and ICI
have greater resources for investment in technology and product development).
164 See, e.g., Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 753 (7th Cir. 1965); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962). These cases rest on the
fear that a large firm's greater resources, i.e., "deep pockets," may be used to
entrench the merged firm's market power in some undefined or poorly defined way.
More recent cases have virtually ignored the theory, suggesting, in the words of one
court, that its underpinnings seem "more metaphorical than real." Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally
HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, § 13.3c, at 507-08 ("[Deep pocket] theories stretch § 7
liability beyond any reasonable limit.").
155 See, e.g., Nestl.&Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 19, 20, 1 83,
89 (noting that the merger would increase the potential for tying and use of fidelity
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with the merger, such conduct may "strengthen" a dominant
position. There are, however, several consequences. The
likelihood of exclusionary conduct is incorporated directly into
the competitive analysis. Injury to competition, rather than to
consumers, may become the measure of competitive harm,
although real dominance may injure consumers as well. Views
of competitors are sought out and weight may be given to
competitors' views on the merits. 156 This is in contrast to the
approach taken in the United States, where Judge Posner in the
Hospital Corp. of America case asserted that the strongest
argument that a merger was pro-competitive, and therefore
lawful, was that the FTC acted in response to a complaint by a
competitor. 157 In other cases, competitors seeking to enjoin
horizontal mergers have been denied standing because they
stand to gain from, rather than be harmed by, decreased
competition and therefore lack antitrust injury.158
Finally, the focus on competitor strength readily lends itself
to the charge that the Commission is protectionist, a charge most
rebates); see also Commission Decision 98/602, 1998 O.J. (L 288) 24, 40, %% 100-01
(Case No. IV/M.938 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan) [hereinafter Guinness/Grand
Metropolitan] (finding increased likelihood of discount pricing, product bundling,
preferential shelf-space arrangements, and efficiencies in sales and marketing);
Hoffmaan-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim, supra note 135, 1998 O.J. (L 234) at 36,
142 (finding merger would create greater opportunity for product bundling);
Kesko/Tuko, supra note 45, 1997 O.J. (L 110), %% 119-25, 133-34 (noting that the
merged firm would gain expanded coverage of customer loyalty schemes and use
buying power to gain further marketing support from suppliers); Orkla/Volvo, supra
note 135, 1996 O.J. (L 66) at 25-26, %% 66-68 (expressing concern that the merged
firm would benefit from increased shelf space allotments, future use of exclusive
dealing, and tying arrangements); RTL/Veronica/Endemol, supra note 136, 1996
O.J. (L 134) at 45, % 78 (noting that the merged firm would benefit from increased
use of package deals to advertisers).
166 The Commission routinely queries competitors on issues of market
definition. See Kauper, supra note 119, at 1732-33. It also seeks and, on occasion,
gives weight to their views on competitive effects. See OrklaVolvo, supra note 135,
1996 O.J. (L 66) at 28, 29, 31, %% 76, 81, 100. In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, one of
the major complaints of counsel for the merging parties went to the Commission's
reliance on data and views submitted by Airbus, their sole remaining competitor.
See infra note 168.
157 See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391-92 (7th Cir.
1986).
158 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986)
(holding that "a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition does
not constitute [an antitrust] injury"); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (indicating that the "[pilaintiffs must prove antitrust
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes [the] defendants' acts unlawful").
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likely to be made when the alleged dominance involves foreign
firms. Furthermore, an argument can be made that a
consequence of the Commission's position is to protect firms that
are weak, not because of a dominant firm's anti-competitive
conduct, but simply because the weaker firm is less efficient. In
the absence of a willingness to allow mergers that strengthen a
dominant position by achieving new efficiencies, the net result
may be that efficiency is effectively penalized.
The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas'59 case illustrates several of
these points and demonstrates how in this respect U.S. and EC
merger rules differ. Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, and Airbus, a
European consortium, were the only significant producers in the
world of large commercial jet aircraft. 160 Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas had roughly seventy percent of the world market, as
measured in terms of current sales.161  Even though the
combined market share of the two merging firms was about
seventy percent and only one competitor remained, the Federal
Trade Commission did not challenge the merger.16 2 Its analysis
rested on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.163 The FTC found that the
future of McDonnell Douglas was bleak, largely because it had
lagged far behind in technological developments. 164 Its current
market share considerably overstated its future potential, a
potential that, in the FTC's view, did not really exist. 165 The
FTC was well aware of the complaints made by Airbus, which
rested, in part, on the fact that Boeing had entered into long-
term supply contracts with a number of the world's airlines,
contracts which Airbus complained would deny it market
access.166 But the FTC disconnected consideration of the effects
of these contracts from its analysis of the merger, suggesting
159 The non-action of the Federal Trade Commission was accompanied by a
public statement. See Boeing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 24,295 (FTC July 1,
1997). The European Commission's action is reported at Commission Decision
97/816, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16 (Case No. IVIM.877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas)
[hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas].
160 See Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 159, 1997 O.J. (L 336) at 17, 9.
161 See id.
162 See Boeing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 24,295.
13 415 U.S. 486 (1974).





that while the contracts were "troubling," their effects could be
examined in a separate proceeding.167
The analysis of the European Commission was strikingly
different. First, the Commission gave considerable weight to the
evidence submitted by Airbus. 168 Second, the Commission did
not consider the future competitive potential of McDonnell
Douglas in light of factors similar to those found in General
Dynamics. It relied, in part, on a price study allegedly showing
that prices were significantly lower when McDonnell Douglas
was a bidder.169 The Commission concluded that Boeing's
dominant position would be strengthened as a result of the
merger. 170 The Commission concluded that as a result of the
merger, Boeing would increase its market share from sixty-four
percent to seventy percent 171 (presumably vis-A-vis Airbus)
through new advantages in financial capability, including the
ability to cross-subsidize between models, technology, bargaining
power, and access to public research and development funds.172
The Commission determined that this strengthening would occur
virtually without regard to McDonnell Douglas's future
competitive potential. There is thus real doubt whether the so-
called General Dynamics factors play any significant role in
cases under the Merger Regulation. The language of the Merger
Regulation that condemns the strengthening of a dominant
position only when "effective competition would be significantly
impeded,"173 however, might be thought to provide the vehicle for
interjecting such factors into the analysis. Finally, the
Commission treated Boeing's exclusive contracts as directly
relevant to its merger analysis, lessening the ability of Airbus to
serve as a check against Boeing's dominance. 174 Ultimately, the
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 159, 1997 O.J. (L 336) at
20, $ 29 (relying on market share figures provided by Airbus).
169 See id. at 25, 158.
170 See id. at 36, 113.
171 See id. at 24, 54.
172 See id. at 24-36, [ 53-124.
173 EC Merger Regulation art. 2, 3, supra note 35, at 17.
174 See Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 159, 1997 O.J. (L 336) at 23, 24
H 43-46, %54(e). In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the Commission treated these
exclusive dealing contracts as an integral part of its merger analysis. The
Commission suggested that the existing contracts would make it difficult for Airbus
to compete effectively and that the merger would increase the merged entity's
ability to enter additional exclusivity arrangements in the future, foreclosing still
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Commission permitted the merger to proceed on the condition
that Boeing undertake to eliminate those exclusive contracts. 175
Contrasted with the FTC's analysis, it is easy to see why
Americans viewed the Commission's decision as protectionist in
the trade policy sense. This criticism, however, is unfair. The
Commission did not depart from its own precedent that, to a
degree, focuses on a merger's impact on competitors. Given this
concern, which is reflected in the language of the Merger
Regulation itself, the decision is perfectly logical. The
comparison of the FTC and Commission decisions, however, does
reflect significant differences in merger policy. But unless we
are prepared to assume that U.S. policy is so obviously correct
that it should always prevail, we must accord the Commission
the right to reach its own conclusions.
Collective dominance cases are more difficult to generalize.
The analysis is very fact-intensive with different elements given
emphasis in different cases. The prototypical case in which
objections are likely to be raised involves a pre-merger
oligopolistic market that has a homogeneous product, a high
degree of price transparency, and high entry barriers. The post-
merger market in such cases is characterized by two top firms
that would have a collective market share in excess of sixty
percent as well as similar costs and market shares.176 While the
more of the market. See id. at 23, 24, T 46, 54(e). Thus, the Commission was
concerned about a strengthening of position through future exclusionary conduct. In
contrast, the Commission in assessing the effects of an acquisition in the ice cream
market found that while freezer exclusivity arrangements could foreclose the
market to other suppliers, the barrier to entry posed by such agreements were not
strengthened by the merger. Moreover, the Commission concluded that any such
anti-competitive effects could be separately evaluated under other competition rules
of the Treaty of Rome, presumably under Article 85. See Unilever France/Ortiz-
Miko (II), supra note 143. The Commission's position in Unilever France/Ortiz-Miko
(II) thus separated the inquiry into the effects of these arrangements from the
merger analysis, much as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission did in Boeing.
175 See BoeingMcDonnell Douglas, supra note 159, 1997 O.J. (L 336) at 37, 5
116.
176 There are numerous Commission decisions meeting these general criteria.
See ABB/Daimler-Benz, supra note 131, 1997 O.J. (L 11) at 9, 11, 5% 44, 57;
Gencor/Lonrho, supra note 131, 1997 O.J. (L 11) at 50, 56, 137, 170; Kali + Salz
Commission Decision, supra note 9, 1994 O.J. (L 186) at 46, 47, %% 51-52, 57;
Nestl6/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 11, 14, 40, 59. The
Commission decision in Kali + Salz was annulled by the European Court of Justice.
See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829. The
Commission's decision in Gencor was upheld by the Court of First Instance in Case
2000]
342 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.74:305
Commission has spoken broadly about oligopolistic dominance,
the most telling fact may be that it has objected primarily in
cases where the resulting structure involved dominance by an
existing firm or an effective duopoly.177
The concept of "collective" dominance rests somewhat
uneasily on the foundation established in single-firm dominance
cases, blending concerns over parallel interdependent conduct
and the health of competitive rivals in the market.
Nestlg/Perrier was the first Commission decision to apply the
concept of oligopolistic dominance. 178 The Commission found
that a merger in a market characterized as oligopolistic even
before the merger, exhibiting high, stable prices, a large degree
of price transparency, and a pattern of parallel behavior,
resulting in a duopoly with two firms whose market shares
together exceeded eighty percent, would make "anticompetitive
parallel behaviour leading to collective abuses much easier."179
The Commission stressed the disparity of size between what
would be the two dominant firms and the remaining small
firms. °8 0 The Commission also noted that the two major firms in
the market had similar costs and market shares and that they
T-102/96, Gencor, Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 4, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 971 (Ct
First Instance 1999).
177 After this article was submitted, the Commission for the first time objected
to a merger that reduced the number of major competitors from four to three,
finding that with the resulting increase in concentration, supply would likely be
further restricted. See Commission Decision 2000/276, 2000 O.J. (L 93) 1 (Case No.
IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice). While the Commission had hinted at such an
outcome previously, it had never actually objected in other than cases resulting in
duopoly.
In Nestls/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) 1, a duopoly case, the
Commission spoke broadly about the likely effects of oligopoly in terms not confined
to duopolies and in language similar to that of American decisions. Furthermore,
the Commission has considered the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior among
the top three to five firms. See Mercedes-Benz/K5gssbohrer, supra note 131, 1995
O.J. (L 211) 1; Krupp/Thyssen, supra note 131, 1995 O.J. (L 251) 18; Pilkington-
Techint/SIV, supra note 131, 1994 O.J. (L 158) 24. But no objection was made to
these transactions. In the cases cited in the preceding note where objection was
made (or would have been made absent the undertakings given by the parties), the
Commission's findings rested on likely coordination among duopolists. In Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, the Commission seemed to suggest that
oligopolistic dominance could never exist among more than four firms. Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 131, 1999 O.J. (L 50) at 43, 113.
178 See Nestld/Perrier, supra note 126, 1992 O.J. (L 356) at 23-29, 108-134.
179 Id. at 25-26, 120.
180 See id. at 25, % 119.
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had a pattern of exchanging price information.181 Finally, the
Commission found that the industry technology was mature8 2
and that entry barriers were very high.83 All of these elements
of the Commission's analysis sound much like those set forth in
the U.S. Merger Guidelines in considering the likelihood of
collusion. At the same time, however, the Commission stressed
the weakness of remaining competitors, particularly in the face
of strong brand and shelf-space preferences, exacerbated by a
system of fidelity rebates and concluded that post-merger, the
two dominant firms would both act in parallel fashion vis-A-vis
each other and independently from their competitors.'84 The
Commission expressed concern that the portfolio of brands of the
merged entity could be used to further disadvantage rivals.185
In subsequent collective dominance cases where objections
have been raised, the Commission has followed the analysis
established in Nestlg/Perrier. In these cases, the Commission
relied on a finding that the merged firm and one or more other
firms would likely behave in a parallel anti-competitive
fashion-a finding based not on any presumption drawn from
high concentration alone, although it is a clear predicate, but on
other considerations including past behavior of firms in the
market; transparency of prices; similarity of market share and
costs among the dominant firms; product homogeneity; and
existing links among the top two or three firms. 186 As in single-
firm cases, competitive objections will be raised only if entry
barriers are found to be high. Buyer size and characteristics are
examined to determine whether buyers have sufficient
countervailing power to keep the collectively dominant firm from
raising prices. Finally, as in single-firm dominance cases, the
Commission places weight on the strength of remaining
competitors and on the impact the proposed merger would likely
have upon them. Thus, these cases reflect the two fundamental
strands apparent in single-firm cases. The firms identified as
181 See id. at 26-27, % 121-125.
182 See id. at 27, %% 126.
183 See id. at 28, 130.
184 See id. at 28, 133.
185 See id.
188 See supra note 176 (citing cases applying the Nestld/Perrier analysis). See
infra note 195 (discussing the question of whether a finding that a pattern of
linkages has existed among the post-merger dominant firms is a necessary predicate
to application of the collective dominance concept).
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dominant may, through parallel conduct, tacitly collude. The
presumption, however, is that the remaining firms will not
collude but instead will vigorously compete and check the
market power of the dominant firms if they have sufficient
strength to do so. Impact on competitors is again directly at
issue.
The decision of the European Court of Justice in Kali + Salz,
a duopoly case, generally accepts the position on collective
dominance that the Commission enunciated in Nestld/Perrier.187
Nevertheless, the Commission's decision was annulled because
(1) its findings as to preexisting linkages between the parties to
the merger and the remaining firm that would have been the
other party to the duopoly after the merger were flawed,18 and
(2) the Commission failed to show "that there is no effective
competitive counterweight to the grouping" brought about by the
merger. 8 9 Specifically, the Commission failed to show that a
remaining firm with ten percent of the market would not provide
such a counterweight. 190
Kali + Salz raises as many questions about collective
dominance as it answers. Consider the standard test for
dominance as applied both under Article 86 and the Merger
Regulation. A fifty percent share of the market might be
sufficient to create a presumption of single-firm dominance, but
what does this mean in a collective dominance setting? Suppose
that after the merger, two firms will have fifty percent of the
market? Or four firms? U.S. enforcement agencies would likely
view a very high four-firm concentration ratio as indicative of a
market where the fear of collusion is great, but they surely
would not do so if four firms of roughly equal size had but fifty
percent of the market. What then, is the approximate threshold
for finding collective dominance? In Kali + Salz, the Court of
Justice found that a combined post-merger market share of sixty
percent indicates the existence of collective dominance,
particularly where shares of remaining firms are relatively
small. 191 But this does not wholly answer the question, which is,
187 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829.
188 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1520-26, [19981 4 C.M.L.R. at 948-949, %% [227-
2391.
189 Id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1526, [19981 4 C.M.L.R. at 951, [248].
190 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1526, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 951, % [2471.
191 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1520, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 947-48, % [2261.
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to use its terms, sixty percent divided among how many firms?
Kali + Salz was dealing with two firms whose combined market
shares exceeded that level, a structure it defined as a duopoly.
And it apparently matters how the market shares were divided.
In the same case, and without explanation, the Court of Justice
concluded that when the combined market share of sixty percent
was divided between two firms unequally, as in the particular
case,192 there could be no conclusive presumption as to the
existence of a collective dominant position. 193 This view is
consistent with the Commission's position that parallel anti-
competitive conduct is most likely when the shares of the
duopolists are roughly equal.
Kali + Salz raises a number of other questions concerning
competitive harm as well. Most basically, can the concept of
collective dominance ever extend beyond duopoly? Must the
Commission establish in every case that the market was
characterized by parallel anti-competitive conduct even prior to
the merger? In Kali + Salz, it did.194 Must there be existing
links between the firms alleged to be collectively dominant? The
Commission's failure of proof on this question, at least in the
eyes of the court, was one of the elements in its decision to annul
the Commission's action.195
192 See id.
193 See id. In Gencor/Lonrho, the Court of First Instance suggested that a
collective dominant position might be established when two firms hold 40% each,
three firms hold 25-30% each, or four firms hold 25% each. Case T-102/96, Gencor,
Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 4, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 971, 1041-42, % 134 (Ct. First
Instance 1999) [hereinafter Gencor].
194 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1512, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at
942, [2021 (suggesting that whether there was prior effective competition between
the companies is a factor to be considered).
195 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1523, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 949, [239] (noting the
less than substantial structural link between the companies). The court's opinion
can be read as simply concluding that the evidence on which the Commission itself
relied upon was weak and that because the Commission relied upon the existence of
linkages between the duopolists, its decision could be challenged on this ground. It
would not, therefore, follow that the existence of such links is a critical element of
proof in all collective dominance cases. This interpretation is borne out by the
subsequent decision in Gencor/Lonrho, where the Court concluded that a
"relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly
within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics... those parties are
in a position to anticipate one another's behavior and are therefore strongly
encouraged to align their conduct in the market" was sufficient proof of structural
linkages. Gencor, supra note 193, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1066, 1 276. Additional
specific linkages would not need to be shown in these circumstances.
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Whatever the unanswered questions, the decision in Kali +
Salz clearly indicates that the strength of remaining competitors
and the impact of the merger upon their future ability to
compete are critical elements in the analysis of both single-firm
and collective dominance cases. A finding of collective
dominance will continue to be based on findings that the firms
found to be collectively dominant will behave in a parallel anti-
competitive manner unless checked by the remaining firms,
firms that are presumed to have incentives to behave
competitively and will do so if they have the requisite strength.
The key differences between the European and American
approaches after Kali + Salz are two-fold. First, regardless of
whether dominance is single or collective, the European
approach rests less on the fear of market-wide collusion than on
the ability of the dominant firms to exert market power over its
competitors. Injury is found, therefore, at least to some degree,
when competitors are injured. Second, any assessment of the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position must focus, in
part, on the competitive health of remaining rivals and on the
impact the merger at issue will have upon them. In contrast, the
U.S. agencies are likely to assume that all of the significant
firms in the market are likely to collude, and their strength and
ability to compete independently is generally not at issue. In
short, it is their disposition to compete, not their ability to do so,
that is key.
B. An Analysis of Defenses
1. The Failing Firm
The so-called failing firm defense is a kind of antitrust
byway, of relevance in relatively few cases. It is, however,
critically important to the outcome of some cases and to the
overall evaluation of merger control philosophy.
The failing company defense came into being with the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1930 decision in the International Shoe case.1 96
19 See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930). In
International Shoe, the Court stated that:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources so
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the
grave probability of a business failure ... we hold that the purchase of its
346 [Vol.74:305
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The legislative history of the 1950 amendments to the Clayton
Act clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to retain it. 197 It
appears in all of the Merger Guidelines since 1968.198 In its
present form, the defense permits an otherwise anti-competitive
merger to go forward when (1) the acquired firm would be unable
to meet its financial obligations in the near future and is not
likely to be able to reorganize successfully under the bankruptcy
laws, (2) when the acquiring company has reasonably sought to
sell the assets of the failing company in a manner that would
pose a lower degree of anti-competitive effects, and (3) when the
assets would leave the market absent the merger at issue.199
The defense under these conditions is absolute.
The defense is sometimes explained on the ground that
when the acquired firm is a competitive non-entity, its
acquisition causes no harm, at least when its assets would
otherwise leave the market. This explanation is not entirely
satisfactory, since it might still be preferable to see its market
share dispersed among remaining firms rather than going to a
single enterprise.200 Nor is this now standard explanation fully
consistent with International Shoe, which stressed, among other
things, that failure would cause injury to the communities where
the failing firm's plants operated, as well as to its
shareholders. 201  This alternative explanation has clear
capital stock by a competitor... does not substantially lessen competition
or restrain commerce within the intent of the Clayton Act.
Id.
197 See S. REP. NO. 1775, at 7 (1956) ("IThe Court has held.., that a company
does not have to be actually in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from [the Clayton
Act's] provisions .... ").
193 See supra note 50 (discussing the Merger Guidelines).
199 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at § 5.1.
20 This difficulty with the explanation was more obvious in earlier versions of
the Guidelines that did not contain the requirement that the defense was
inapplicable unless there was a showing that absent the merger, the assets of the
failing firm would otherwise exit the market. See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra,
note 50, § 5.1 (1984). Under this prior version, the assets could lawfully go to a
dominant firm even though absent the merger, the assets would remain in the
market but would be divided among smaller firms over time. See generally 4A
AREEDA, supra note 24, 925 (providing a more satisfactory economic justification
that supports a very limited failing company defense).
201 See International Shoe Co., 280 U.S. at 302-03 (emphasizing the "resulting
loss to [the failing firm's] stockholders and injury to the communities where its
plants were operated").
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overtones of industrial, rather than competitive, policy.202 It
reflects a fear of business failure for social reasons.
The European version of the failing firm defense was a core
issue in Kali + Salz. The Commission had concluded that what
amounted to an acquisition by the dominant German potash
producer of a former state-owned East German potash producer,
an acquisition which effectively gave the joint enterprise a
monopoly in the German market, was not in violation of the
Merger Regulation under a version of the failing firm defense.20 3
The case rested on the Commission's findings that the East
German enterprise was not economically viable and would be
forced out of the market in the near future, even though that
might not have happened immediately for social and regional
political reasons.20 4  The Commission also noted that this
outcome was in line with the fundamental Community objective
of "strengthening the Community's economic and social
cohesion."20 5
The Kali + Salz case arose in a particularly sensitive setting,
the absorption of East Germany into the economy of the unified
German state. It reflects the problems arising out of the
privatization of a state-owned enterprise. In a real sense, it
represents a failure of competition policy-a lost opportunity to
use the privatization process to bring about a more competitive
market.
The French government attacked this application of the
"failing company" defense.20 6 It argued that the Commission
erred by not considering all of the elements of the defense as
applied in the United States.20 7  The argument that the
202 See generally 4A AREEDA, supra note 24, 925; Kauper, supra note 50, at
526-27.
203 See Kali + Salz Commission Decision, supra note 9, 1994 O.J. (L 186) at 49-
52, 70-90 (characterizing the acquisition as a "rescue merger"). A similar defense
was raised in Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, supra note 151, 1991 O.J. (L 334) at
52, 31, but was factually rejected "[w]ithout prejudice as to whether such a
consideration is relevant" under the Merger Regulation. Id.; see also Commission
Notice, 1991 O.J. (C 223) 38 (Case No. IV/M.116 Kelt/American Express).
204 See Kali + Salz Commission Decision, supra note 9, 1994 O.J. (L 186) at 38,
77 ("Even if this does not happen immediately, for social, regional and general
political reasons, a closure of MdK is to be expected in the near future with a
sufficient degree of probability.").
205 Id. at 53, % 95.
206 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829.
207 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1482, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 922, % [91].
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Commission should have applied American standards is both
surprising and unusual,208 particularly coming from the French.
Specifically, the French argued that the Commission's finding
that the acquired firm would be forced out of the market in the
near future if not taken over was less severe than the U.S.
requirements that the firm be unable to meet its obligations in
the near future and not be able to reorganize successfully in
bankruptcy.209 In the end, the Court of Justice accepted the
Commission's criteria, namely, that the defense was applicable
when (1) the acquired firm would be forced out of the market in
the near future; (2) the acquiring firm would gain the acquired
firm's market share in that event; and (3) there was no less anti-
competitive purchaser.210 Only the second of these requirements
varies substantially from American standards. By requiring
proof that if the acquired firm were allowed to fail, its market
share would go to the acquirer, the court concluded that there
was otherwise no causal link between the acquisition and a
strengthening of a dominant position.211 This requirement also
responds to one of the standard criticisms of the American
approach. The court was emphatic in its statement that failure
to follow American law was not a ground for invalidating the
Commission's decision. 212 While it noted the Commission's
20s A similar argument was made before the Court of First Instance in Case T-
83/91, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, [1995] E.C.R. H-755, 11-824-27,
[1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 726, 772-74, IN 143-50 (Ct. First Instance 1994) [hereinafter
Tetra Pak International v. Commission], where the applicant in a predatory pricing
case under Article 86 urged the court to follow the ruling in Brooke Group, Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). In that case, the Court
determined that the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant had a
reasonable prospect of recouping its losses. See id. at 243. The Court of First
Instance declined to follow American law on this point. See Tetra Pak International,
supra, 1995 E.C.R. at H-827, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. at 774, 150.
209 See Kali + Salz, supra note 9, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1482-83, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at
922, %% [91-97].
210 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1487-88, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 925, %% [111-14].
211 See id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1488, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 925, 927 %% [114], [124].
Several recent Commission decisions have applied these standards. See Commission
Decision 98/663, 1998 O.J. (L 316) 1, 15-6 %TI 109-13 (Case No. IV/M.890
Blokker/Toys R' Us) [hereinafter BlokkerToys R' US]; Commission Decision
97/610, 1996 O.J. (L 247) 1, 43-44, %% 247-59 (Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie]NOM)
[hereinafter Saint-GobainWacker-Chemie/NOM].




statements about "economic and social cohesion," it did not
comment further.213
The differences between U.S. and EC law on the failing
company defense do not seem to be of any great consequence. In
both jurisdictions, the agencies and courts have not based the
defense on industrial and social policy concerns, although they
lurk in the background of the defense in both instances.
Certainly the EC cannot be charged here with incorporating
such policies into its merger analysis. It is not easy to find any
other case overtly doing so, even though the Commission is
charged with all of the EC's economic policies. Concededly, we
are not privy to the deliberations of the Commission. Clearly,
industrial policy concerns could have come into play in some
cases without being disclosed. We can go only by what the
Commission says publicly. But the same can be said of the
Justice Department and the FTC.
2. The Treatment of Efficiencies
This article will now turn to the final issue, the so-called
efficiencies defense. This, it may appear, is at the heart of U.S.
and EC differences. How a merger control system deals with
efficiencies says a lot about its purpose. As indicated above,
Dean Pitofsky called for an expanded efficiencies defense in
merger cases in the United States to enhance the
competitiveness of U.S. firms in world markets, and that one
ground for his proposal was that merger controls in other places,
particularly the EC, recognized such a defense. 214 As of now, and
partially because as Chairman of the FTC, he has led the United
States to a greater weighing of efficiency claims, 215 there are
indeed significant differences between the U.S. and EC in this
respect. But the differences run in reverse. The United States
now takes efficiencies directly into account, while the EC
competition rules with respect to mergers do not. As a result, an
American firm whose merger is approved in the United States on
213 Id. 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1484, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. at 923, [99].
214 See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
215 The 1997 amendment to the 1992 U.S. Merger Guidelines dealing with
efficiency claims was largely the result of an FTC study and series of hearings
initiated by Chairman Pitofsky. See generally 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 42, (with April 8, 1977 revisions).
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efficiency grounds could run afoul of the competition law of the
EC.
Under both U.S. and EC competition law, mergers below
certain measures of concentration or dominance are thought to
raise no serious issues with respect to collusion or dominance
and are therefore lawful. There is no reason to separately assess
efficiencies in such cases. If all mergers in which real efficiencies
are likely to be achieved are below these threshold levels, there
is no reason to worry about such efficiencies. Put another way, if
efficiencies such as scale economies and economies of
distribution will be achieved before these levels are reached,
mergers above them will pose no further efficiency issues and no
efficiencies defense would be needed. How confident we are
about this obviously depends to a substantial degree on how high
market share and concentration thresholds are set.
Conversely, the problem becomes more difficult if there are a
significant number of cases involving mergers that achieve
significant economies but are otherwise thought to be anti-
competitive because of the increased potential for collusion or
market dominance. The exercise of market power, whether
collectively or by a single firm, will restrict output and increase
price. In the United States, at least, this is the basis for finding
competitive harm. But if the merger also enhances efficiency,
prices could drop. In the abstract, we cannot determine whether
prices will go up or down. To answer the question, we need to
know the price increasing effects of collusion or dominance, the
price decreasing effects of efficiencies, and balance them off-a
daunting task.216
In the mid-1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court paid scant
attention to efficiencies. To the extent they were considered,
they were used to argue that if efficiencies were achieved, the
merging firms were advantaged, and competition was harmed.217
This outcome may be thought consistent with the relatively
populist approach to antitrust which characterized the Court's
antitrust analysis at the time, but it is obviously perverse in
216 See Kauper, supra note 50, at 519-525 (providing a fuller discussion of this
balancing).
217 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Congress
was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in
economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.").
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today's world, where efficiency is the central theme of antitrust
analysis.
The first Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of
Justice in 1968 did not suggest that a merger would be
condemned because it created efficiencies. 218 Unless there were
"exceptional circumstances," the Department would not accept
the production of economies as a defense because with the
threshold levels set forth, which by today's standards were quite
low, it was not likely to challenge mergers of companies
operating below a size necessary to achieve those economies
anyway.219 Economies, in any event, could generally be achieved
through means short of merger, and measurement of the
magnitude of likely efficiencies involves "severe difficulties."220
Between 1968 and the issuance of new Guidelines in 1982,
commentators sharply disagreed over whether an efficiencies
defense should be recognized. 221 With the issuance of the 1982
Guidelines, the "exceptional circumstances" seed planted in 1968
remained just that. Now, efficiencies would be considered only
"in extraordinary circumstances."222 Even then, they were to be
proved by "clear and convincing evidence," and would be
considered only if they could not be achieved through internal
expansion or a less anti-competitive merger and only "in close
cases."223 With the issuance of new Guidelines in 1984, the seed
grew into a sapling. The Department now recognized that some
mergers it would otherwise challenge might give rise to
efficiencies of various types and that when they were established
by clear and convincing evidence, the efficiencies would be
considered.224 Again, however, only those efficiencies that could
218 See 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 50.
219 See id § 10.
220 Id.
221 For further discussion of these views, see 4A AREEDA, supra note 24, 940;
Kauper, supra note 50, at 519-525. During this period, courts uniformly rejected
efficiency claims on the ground that they were not cognizable under section seven.
See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d
913, 936 (9th Cir. 1975); Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1089 (8th
Cir. 1972) ("Honest intentions, business purposes and economic benefits are not a
defense to violations of an antimerger law."); United States v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 942-943 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[Practices] which
restrict competition are unlawful no matter how beneficent they may be.").
222 1982 MERGER GUIDELINEs, supra note 50, § V.A.
223 Id.
224 See 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 50, § 3.5.
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not be achieved by other means would be taken into account.225
The more significant the competitive risk, the greater the
magnitude of the net efficiencies that would be required.226 The
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are virtually the same.
227
In 1997, largely under the leadership of now Chairman
Pitofsky, the 1992 Guidelines' efficiency provisions set forth a
more elaborate analysis of efficiencies. 228  Specifically,
efficiencies which cannot, as a practical matter, be achieved
short of the merger in question and can reasonably be verified in
terms of both their likelihood and magnitude, will be considered
in the overall assessment of likely competitive effects.229 For
example, significant efficiencies may make collusion less likely.
On the other hand, the efficiencies may be overborne by the
merger's other adverse effects. The question to be asked is
whether the net effect is to reverse the merger's anticompetitive
potential. While effects of both types will not simply be
compared, the greater the magnitude of potential harm, the
greater the efficiencies must be. If the potential for harm is
"particularly large," then "extraordinarily great" efficiencies
must be shown.230 In the words of the Guidelines, "[elfficiencies
almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near monopoly."231
This move to a greater recognition of efficiencies has been
mirrored in several recently litigated merger cases, where the
potential for efficiencies has been given considerable weight in
allowing mergers to proceed. 232 Whether put as a formal defense
2M See id.
226 See id.
227 See 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 4.





232 In a series of decisions beginning in the 1980s, courts began to consider
efficiency claims but rejected them without directly considering whether such claims
were cognizable either because the likely efficiencies were not proven, could be
achieved without the merger, or were not likely to be passed through to consumers.
See, e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-1224 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that there was insufficient evidence that efficiencies would benefit
consumers); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34, 61-63 (D.D.C. 1998)
(stating that although substantial efficiencies were shown, savings could also be
achieved through existing and continued competition); FTC v. Tenet Healthcare
Corp. 17 F. Supp.2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev'd 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating that efficiencies could be obtained without the merger and, in any event,
not likely to be passed on); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064,
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or not, the small seed of 1968 is becoming a full-blown tree. How
these Guidelines will be applied in actual practice is hard to tell.
Recent speeches of enforcement officials have warned the Bar
that there may not be many mergers that meet the new
efficiency criteria.
And what about the EC? In the article by Dean Pitofsky, his
statement that the EC took efficiencies into account rested, in
part, on its early decision in the de Havilland case.233 In that
case, the Commission reserved judgment about the relevance of
cost savings under the Merger Regulation, finding that the
proposed cost savings were too small to have any offsetting
impact and could, in any event, be achieved in other ways. 4 He
also pointed to the language of Article 85(3) of the Treaty of
Rome, exempting certain otherwise anti-competitive agreements
that improve "the production or distribution of goods," or
"promote technical or economic progress."235  The Merger
Regulation itself directs the Commission to consider "the
development of technical and economic progress provided that it
1084-1085 (D. Del. 1991) (rejecting the efficiency claim because there was no
assurance that savings would be passed on to consumers); United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (suggesting that
efficiencies need not be considered if they could be achieved less restrictively), afld,
898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); FTC v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1131,
1145 (N.D. 111. 1988) (suggesting that even if efficiencies were present, competition
will not necessarily be enhanced), affd. sub nom., FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868
F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989); California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Stores Co., 697
F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that there was no reason to believe
that efficiencies, even if proven, would be passed on to consumers), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989).
More recently, however, several courts have relied on the presence of efficiencies
to uphold what might otherwise be viewed as anticompetitive mergers where, in the
court's judgment, savings are likely to be passed on to consumers. See United States
v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
that the efficiencies gained in the merger would result in benefits to the consumer);
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(finding that the merger would result in significant efficiencies that would be passed
on to consumers); see also United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840,
849 (W.D. Va.) (suggesting that an efficiency motive is a relevant factor), affd, 892
F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989). In FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997),
the court assumed that efficiencies might, in some cases, be a viable defense but
concluded that the claims presented were unverifiable and that estimates of pass-
through benefits to consumers were unrealistic. See id. at 1088-90; see also FTC v.
Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district
court should "have considered evidence of enhanced efficiency").
233 See Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, supra note 151, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.
234 See id. at 59-60, H 65-69.
235 EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 85(3).
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is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to
competition."236
One might think, as Dean Pitofsky did, that these provisions
call for a detailed assessment of efficiencies. But the exempting
provisions of Article 85(3) do not have a counterpart in Article 86
and its prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, the Article
from which the language of the Merger Regulation was drawn.
Furthermore, the "technical and economic progress" provision of
the Merger Regulation has seldom been alluded to.27  In
Philips IGrundig,28 the Commission referred to the achievement
of economies of scale as evidence of a strengthening of an
established firm, hardly the use of such economies as a
defense.2 9 Recent statements by EC officials take the position
236 EC Merger Regulation art. 2, % (1)(b), supra note 35, at 16.
237 The language of this provision itself suggests that it is not to read as
creating an efficiencies defense. Technical and economic progress is to be considered
only if (1) it works to the advantage of consumers and (2) if it does not provide an
obstacle to competition. The first of these conditions is consistent with the
efficiencies defense as recognized in the United States, where there must be
evidence that cost savings will be passed on to consumers. The second condition
suggests that once a strengthening of a dominant position is found, considerations
of technical and economic progress are no longer relevant. This appears to be the
interpretation adopted by the Commission. See Gencor, supra note 193, [1999] 4
C.M.L.R. at 1056, 9 212-14; Saint-Gobain/Wacker-ChemieNOM, supra note 211,
1996 O.J. (L 247) at 42-43, 91 244-46; Commission Decision 94/922, 1994 O.J. (L
364) 1, at 19-20, %% 100-01 (Case No. IV/M.469 MSG Media Service) [hereinafter
MSG Media Service] (interpreting the Article as requiring that no obstacle to
competition is created); Accor/Wagons-Lits, supra note 135, 1992 O.J. (L 204) at 8-
9, %% 25(4), 26 (noting the resultant dominant position, that efficiencies were not
established, and that there were other means of achieving efficiencies);
Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, supra note 151, 1991 O.J. (L 334) at 60, 91 69
(stressing that consumers will be faced with a dominant position which would not be
to their advantage); see also Commission Decision 96/177, 1995 O.J. (L 53) 204 at
37-38, %% 145-52 (Nordic Satellite Distribution) (noting that although the merger
could be highly beneficial to consumers, the infrastructure must be open to other
parties).
'm' Commission Notice, 1993 O.J. (C 336) 11 (Case No. IV/M.382
Philips/Grundig).
239 As early as 1992, Fr6dric Jenny predicted that the Commission was more
likely to treat efficiencies as an element contributing to the strengthening of a
dominant position than as a defense. See Fr~ddric Jenny, Competition and
Efficiency, 1993 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 185 (Barry Hawk ed., 1994); Frdddric
Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust
Attack?, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 591, 603 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993) ("The
possibility that a merger might lead to static efficiency gains... or to dynamic
efficiency gains.., which other non-merging firms are unlikely to achieve is
interpreted as prima facie evidence that the merger will enable the merging firms to
acquire a dominant position incompatible with the common market."). Such a use of
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that under the Merger Regulation, once a dominant position or
strengthening of a dominant position is found, efficiencies are
not considered. Moreover, the officials have noted that, given
the high threshold in the Merger Regulation, the firms whose
merger is at issue will have achieved most scale economies
before the merger itself, an explanation reminiscent of the 1968
Guidelines in the U.S.24° Thus, the difference, if any, is now the
reverse of that described by Dean Pitofsky.241
what appear to be likely efficiencies as evidence that an acquisition will strengthen a
dominant position is seldom done explicitly, but in some cases this appears to be the
case. See, e.g., BlokkerToys 'R' US, 1998 O.J. (L 316) at 13-14, 95-97 (stating
that the acquired firm will obtain knowledge of consumer habits, advantages of
scale economies, and better access to advertising and support services-all to the
detriment of competitors); ABB/Daimler-Benz, supra note 151, 1997 O.J. (L 11) 1, at
13-14, %% 64-65 (stating that as full line suppliers, dominant firms can handle
larger orders and obtain better capacity utilization, thus strengthening their
dominant position); Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox, supra note 125, 1996
O.J. (L 75) at 52, 83 (stating that merged production lines will give parties added
flexibility in handling special orders, placing competitors at a disadvantage);
RTLfVeronica/Endemol, 1996 O.J. (L 134) at 45, 77-78 (noting similar cost
advantages); MSG Media Service, supra note 237, 1994 O.J. (L 364) at 16, 77-80
(noting that a number of the advantages the merging parties are said to have over
their competitors appear to be simple cost advantages).
240 The Commission itself has asserted that efficiencies are relevant under the
Merger Regulation only in determining whether a dominant position has been
created or strengthened, not to mitigate the effect of that dominance once
established. See Contribution from the Commission of the European Union to the
Committee on Competition Law and Policy of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Concerning Efficiency Claims in Mergers
and other Cooperative Agreements (November 1995); REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 65, 20. More recently, Alexander
Schaub, Director-General of the Competition Directorate General-European
Commission (DGIV) has said much the same, recognizing that efficiency gains
beyond those reached at the levels at which dominance is established may not be
taken into account and that efficiency considerations have played little role in EC
merger analysis. Compare Alexander Schaub, European Competition Policy in a
Changing Economic Environment, 1996 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 71, 83-84
(Barry Hawk ed., 1997) with Juan Briones Alonso, Vertical Aspects of Mergers, Joint
Ventures and Strategic Alliances, 1997 FORDHAM CORP. LAW INST. 131, 145 (Barry
Hawk ed., 1998) (suggesting that the Commission may consider efficiencies in close
cases but does not have freedom under the Merger Regulation to do so once
strengthening of a dominant position is established).
241 Dean Pitofsky has since recognized that the promise of the de Havilland
decision has not been met and that it now appears that the European Commission is
not prepared to recognize an efficiencies defense or otherwise consider efficiencies in
merger, as opposed to Article 85, proceedings. See Robert Pitofsky, Vertical
Restraints and Vertical Aspects of Mergers - A U.S. Perspective, 1998 FORDHAM
CORP. LAW INST. 11, 113-114 (Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
MERGER CONTROL
But is the difference very real? The Commission, after all, is
dealing only with mergers creating or strengthening a dominant
position. We have already seen that they have challenged only
mergers creating a single firm with a market share in the range
of fifty percent or higher, or a duopoly where the top two firms
after the merger are at a level of sixty percent or higher. The
revised U.S. Merger Guidelines suggest that in a merger with
quite high market shares and where the potential for harm is
"particularly large," efficiencies must be "extraordinarily
great."242 The difference, then, may be more apparent than real,
unless the Commission continues from time to time to treat
efficiencies as a basis for attacking acquisitions, in which case
the differences are very real. If nothing else, the Commission's
treatment of efficiencies says a good deal about its overall goals
in the prevention of mergers adding to the strength of dominant
firms. Coupled with the emphasis on preserving independent
firms as a core part of its harm analysis, it suggests that the
Commission is less concerned with efficiencies than is the U.S.
CONCLUSION
That there are significant differences in U.S. and EC merger
control cannot be denied. Even with recognition of oligopolistic
dominance, the EC's recognition of oligopoly has not led it to
develop an approach based on the increased likelihood of
collusion to the degree that this bedrock concern is the
centerpiece of its analysis, as it is in the United States. 243 The
EC has raised objections only in cases of single firm dominance
or duopoly. There are very substantial differences in the
treatment of efficiencies, not only in terms of defenses, but in the
degree to which the assessment in the EC of the strengthening of
a dominant position takes into account the strength of remaining
competitors and thus may protect the weak, i.e., less efficient,
against the strong.
To a degree, these differences rest on the language of the
Merger Regulation itself. This is more than a technicality which
the Commission could work around if it elected to do so. The
242 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 42, § 4 (with April 8, 1997 revisions).
w With the further development of the unilateral effects doctrine in the United
States, however, the United States may also be moving away from collusion-based
standards and in the direction of the European approach, albeit without the
European emphasis on impact on competitors.
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Merger Regulation was a carefully crafted compromise that took
years to achieve. Member states disagreed sharply over the
substance of merger control policy. Their disagreements were
heightened by the fact that as to mergers within the Merger
Regulation's thresholds, the Commission's jurisdiction was made
exclusive. As to these mergers, each member State was
concerned that the EC approach tracked its own rules as closely
as possible. This concern was explicitly noted in Kali + Salz,
where the Court of Justice found that the concept of oligopolistic
dominance was a central feature of German law, a feature
which, the Court noted, Germany would not have been prepared
to surrender to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.
It would be a mistake, however, to explain these differences
with the assertion that the Merger Regulation reflects simply an
arbitrary set of compromises. Rather, it reflects a coherent set of
policy choices drawn from the traditions of the EC. From the
very beginning, the overarching purpose of the Commission has
been the integration of the economies of its member states into a
single market. The Treaty of Rome contains no provision that
deals directly with merger control. Faced with firms that often
enjoyed protected status and were not of efficient size to compete
effectively outside their protected home markets, it was the
policy of the Commission to encourage mergers, not only to
permit firms to achieve economic size, but to allow their
penetration throughout the entire market. In this setting, there
was little concern about the anti-competitive consequences of
mergers. Moreover, at least some member states did have
merger controls in place. The Treaty of Rome opted instead to
control the practices of dominant firms under Article 86, where
the prohibition of abuse confers more regulatory authority on the
Commission than the U.S. deems appropriate under the
Sherman Act. The Merger Regulation, then, can be seen as
reflecting an earlier step in the process-a conclusion that the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position through merger
is best prevented rather than regulated after dominance has
been established. And while confident about the
interdependence of duopolists, the Commission has been
skeptical about the broader notions of oligopoly employed in the




It would also be a mistake to suggest that the EC has not
fully embraced American antitrust analysis because they do not
understand it. They know our policies as well as we do--a
conclusion reinforced by the high degree of cooperation between
the Commission and American enforcement agencies. That they
choose to disagree is their business.
Having said that, however, the fact is that the European
Commission now confronts the problem addressed by Dean
Pitofsky concerning U.S. policy. Throughout most of its history,
the EC has directed its attention inward, toward the
achievement of a single, fully integrated market. Such a market
now exists, in the sense that most trade and regulatory barriers
among the member states have been removed. As it turns
outward, it must focus more directly on the competitiveness of its
finms in global markets. This will force it to give greater
credence to efficiency claims than it has in the past, the very
point made by Dean Pitofsky as to United States antitrust policy
in general, and merger policy in particular.
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